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ON TIME AS A FACTOR DIFFERENTIATING
FEELING AND THOUGHT. ARISTOTLE – FORTENBAUGH
– ANTIPHON THE SOPHIST – WEININGER*

*You never know what will happen when it comes to a real nightingale.
But with a mechanical bird everything is under control.*

H. Ch. Andersen

The present paper is provoked by a reflection on the relationship between feeling¹ and thinking, the final impulse coming from a reading of William W. Fortenbaugh's book *Aristotle on Emotion*². Fortenbaugh wrote:

*[...] in sudden alarms the logical half of the soul does not come into play, because there is not time for reflection and deliberation. Response to sudden danger depends entirely on the alogical half of the bipartite soul [...]*³.

This claim follows a reference to [EN] 1117^a17–22⁴. I am not sure how to understand it, as it is preceded by an introducing sentence: [u]sing the language of Aristotle's newly won political and ethical psychology we may say that Does it mean that the thesis spelled out by Fortenbaugh is, in Aristotle, but implicit (*we may*)? In a footnote, Fortenbaugh clarifies:

I do not want to say that all kinds of unreflective judgments are to be assigned to the alogical half of

* The first draft of the paper was prepared during a stay at the Fondation Hardt where I found excellent conditions of work in November 2007 and completed during a visit in Cork and Dublin in September/October 2010 sponsored by the Royal Academy of Ireland. The paper was presented at a Work in Progress Seminar, October 4, 2010, Trinity College Dublin.

¹ For clarity, let me specify that I use *feeling* as a general category for all affective phenomena. This is a suitable rendering of the German *Gefühl* in standard translations, e.g. of Max Scheler. See also C. G. Jung, *The Tavistock Lectures* [1935] in: C. G. Jung, *Collected Works*, vol. 18: *The Symbolic Life. Miscellaneous Writings*, transl. R. F. C. Hull, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1977, p. 30: *German psychologists have already recommended the suppression of the word Empfindung for feeling, and propose that one should use the word Gefühl (feeling) for values, while the word Empfindung should be used for sensation.* In turn, I use affectivity to encompass feelings in their horizontal aspect (as *modi*, say, sorrow, love, joy, fear, anger, love) as well as in their vertical aspect (as levels: pleasure/joy/happiness/bliss, liking/sympathy/love/friendship, etc.).

² W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion. A Contribution to philosophical psychology, rhetoric, poetics, politics and ethics*, [2nd ed.] Duckworth, London 2002. See also R. Zaborowski [review of] W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...* in: *Eos* 93, 2006, pp. 375–379.

³ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...*, p. 72.

⁴ In n. 1, p. 71 one reads: *In a sudden situation such as confronts the more courageous man there is no time for calculation and reasoning (1117^a21) and therefore no time for search and deliberation.*

*the soul. That would be just as much a mistake as attributing all such judgments to the logical half.*¹

This illuminating, two-way restriction is conveyed when Fortenbaugh expressly talks about emotions:

*In the course of deliberation when the emotions are not in play, a man may have an insight and hit upon something in advance of his deliberations.*²

So in Fortenbaugh the opposition between feeling (emotion) and thought is explicit, but if the nature of this opposition is explained by time, then only implicitly. A recent collection of W. W. Fortenbaugh's papers³ seems not settle this particular point explicitly either. Here is a pick of his remarks on time with a view to Aristotle's passage:

*A virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned reflection when time permits. The virtuous man confronted with sudden danger does not have time to reflect.*⁴

*He does not have time to deliberate and so must act in accordance with his disposition.*⁵

*[...] there is no time for calculation and the exercise of practical wisdom [...]*⁶

*In sudden dangers, for example, there is no time for logos and logismos.*⁷

*[...] in sudden dangers which leave no time for calculated response (1117a17–22) [...]*⁸

*[...] an immediate response leaves no time for calculations of advantage.*⁹

Fortenbaugh obviously speaks about time. He repeatedly uses this category but nowhere, it seems, does he state explicitly – as it could be inferred – that *time is the factor that differentiates feeling (emotion) and thought (reason)*,

¹ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...*, p. 74, n. 1.

² W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...*, p. 74, n. 1.

³ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side. On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2006.

⁴ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 49, n. 8 quoted above.

⁵ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 116. This immediately follows Fortenbaugh's translation of Aristotle's passage (see below).

⁶ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 118.

⁷ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 167.

⁸ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 189.

⁹ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 197.

since the relation between time and *emotion[al]* is mentioned only once¹. Is it, therefore, Aristotle who did so?

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* passage Fortenbaugh mentions, Aristotle says:

διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἕξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χεῖρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· [...]

(1117 a 17–25).

Here is a translation I propose:

*that is why to be fearless and untroubled in sudden fears seems to be more courageous than in foreseen [fears]; indeed, he is more [courageous] by disposition, less by preparation; in fact [things which] show beforehand – someone would choose [them] by calculation and logos, and those [things which appear] suddenly [he would choose them] according to disposition. Ignorant [people] prove to be courageous too, and they are not far from [those who] are confident, but [ignorant people] are worse as they have no assessment, while others [possess it]. That is why they hold out for a while [emphases added]*².

¹ See W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 49, n. 8.

² For the reader's convenience, I provide a couple of other translations, starting with Fortenbaugh's (in: *Aristotle's Practical Side*, p. 116):

Wherefore it is the mark of an even more courageous man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarm than in foreseen dangers. For his response was more the result of an established disposition, since it was less on account of preparation. For a man might choose foreseen dangers on account of calculation and reason, but sudden dangers in accordance with his disposition. [...]
[here Fortenbaugh's translation stops]

Hence it is thought a sign of still greater courage to be fearless and undismayed in sudden alarms than in dangers that were foreseen. Bravery in unforeseen danger springs more from character, as there is less time for preparation; one might resolve to face a danger one can foresee, from calculation and on principle, but only a fixed disposition of Courage will enable one to face sudden peril. Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous; and they come very near to those whose bravery rests on a sanguine temperament, though inferior to them inasmuch as they lack self-confidence, which the sanguine possess. Hence the sanguine stand firm for a time. (transl. H. Rackham, William Heinemann Ltd, London 1947)

C'est pourquoi encore on considère qu'un homme montre un plus grand courage en demeurant sans crainte et sans trouble dans les dangers qui s'abattent brusquement que dans les dangers qu'on peut prévoir à l'avance, car le courage provient alors davantage d'une disposition du caractère, et demande moins de préparation: en effet, les dangers prévisibles peuvent faire l'objet d'un choix calculé et raisonnable, tandis que les périls soudains

What does it mean? In this passage, three terms are time-related: *sudden* [fears] – *suddenly* – *a while*:

	αἰφνιδίως [φόβοις]	ἐξαίφνης	τινα χρόνον
Rackham	<i>sudden</i>	<i>sudden</i>	<i>a time</i>
Tricot	<i> brusquement</i>	<i>soudains</i>	<i>un certain temps</i>
Ross – Barnes	<i>sudden</i>	<i>sudden</i>	<i>a time</i>
Fortenbaugh	<i>sudden</i>	<i>sudden</i>	[outside the translated passage]

As all translations agree and my own goes in the same direction, I pass on to three time-related terms. The adjective αἰφνιδίως, rather infrequent (one case in Aristotle according to the TLG), derived from αἶψα (LSJ: *quick, forthwith, on a sudden*, Chantraine: *vite, soudain*), means *quickly, suddenly* (LSJ: *unforeseen, sudden*). The idea of immediacy is manifest. The adverb ἐξαίφνης, much more frequent than the previous word, derived from the same adverb (αἶψα), expresses the same idea (LSJ: *on a sudden*). Finally, the noun χρόνον applies in the context to a certain (τινα) period of time and for this reason it can be put in contrast with the two previous:

immediacy ————— [holding out for a] while

Thereby we come across the opposition between immediacy and waiting for a while put in relation with a particular feeling – fear. But, as it seems to me, Aristotle does not lay down that

[...] in sudden alarms the logical half of the soul does not come into play, because there is not time for reflection and deliberation. Response to sudden danger depends entirely on the alogical half of the

exigent une disposition stable du caractère. Les gens ignorant le danger apparaissent eux aussi courageux, et ils ne sont pas fort éloignés des hommes confiants en eux-mêmes; ils leur sont cependant inférieurs par leur manque total d'assurance, alors que les autres en possèdent. Aussi les hommes qui se fient à eux-mêmes tiennent-ils fermement pendant un certain temps [...].
(transl. J. Tricot, J. Vrin, Paris 1972)

Hence also it is thought the mark of a brave man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than to be so in those that are foreseen; for it must have proceeded more from a state of character, because less from preparation; for acts that are foreseen may be chosen by calculation and reason, but sudden actions in accordance with one's state of character. People who are ignorant also appear brave, and they are not far removed from those of a sanguine temper, but are inferior inasmuch as they have no self-reliance while these have. Hence also the sanguine hold ground for a time [...].
(transl. W. D. Ross in: J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, tt. 1–2, University Press, Princeton 1984)

And the explanation given *ad loc.* by J. Burnet in: *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Methuen & Co, London 1900, p. 151 is the following: ἀπὸ ἐξέως κτλ. *We know that a man may perform a brave act without being already brave; for it is only so that he becomes brave. But it is only the formed ἐξίς that can be trusted in an emergency. [...] ἀξίωμα, not 'dignity' but 'self-reliance'. It is the same thing as τὸ οἶσθαι κρείττους εἶναι.*

bipartite soul [...]

or that

[a] virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned reflection when time permits. The virtuous man confronted with sudden danger does not have time to reflect

or that, as I understand it,

time is a factor differentiating feeling (emotion) and thought (reason).

But Fortenbaugh makes another substantial point. According to Fortenbaugh, Aristotle draws

a distinction between two fundamental modes of human behaviour, emotional response and reasoned reflection, and correlates this distinction with an ethical distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom¹.

This observation is crucial not only for historical research and interpretations of Aristotle’s philosophy but also for the study of human behaviour. In fact, we should think decisions, good as well as wrong, can stem either from *emotional response* or from *reasoned reflection*. Feeling and thought operate on the same ground and what differentiates them is the temporal mode: a *minimum* interval of time vs a *maximum* interval of time. Hence, in either case one can arrive at beneficial and salutary as well as harmful and disastrous consequences². Now, if we agree to combine these two observations – the latter explicit and the first implicit in Fortenbaugh – we can say that the value of a feeling and of a thought depend on the ultimate outcome:

determinant	based on thought	based on feeling
differentiating factor	[certain (τινα) period of time =] delay	[no time =] immediacy
outcome	positive	positive
	negative	negative

Historical evidence is distorted when we hear, all too often, that feeling leads to regrettable and harmful effects, and that right and positive results can be obtained when acting by thought (reasoning). Such propositions are gross reductions of Aristotle’s approach, and they can be presented broadly as follows:

determinant	based on thought	based on feeling
differentiating factor	[certain (τινα) period of time =] delay	[no time =] immediacy
outcome	positive	?
	?	negative

¹ W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...*, p. 74.

² See also W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion ...*, p. 74, n. 1 quoted above.

From now on I am going to focus on how useful this criterion – *time as differentiating the feeling (emotion) and the thought (reason)*¹ – can be for an analysis of the nature of affectivity and its relation with rationality.

Let me start with an example. A bus arrives and I hesitate to get on it. Much depends on the time I have. If I have enough time I can afford to calculate. Needless to say, I can make a right or a wrong calculation as to whether it is better to get on it or not. But if I have not enough time, I (have to) act spontaneously. Here again, I can make a good or a bad choice. But this situation – unless I have to take the bus to save someone's life – is not appalling. What if you notice someone drowning? Then there is little time to make a calculation at all.

This, of course, would not apply in the case of a person of excellent fitness, say, a swimming coach or a very experienced swimmer, who therefore has no real decision to make since they take no risk. For the same reason I set apart an experienced driver who reacts immediately – with no delay – to avoid a skid and stands a good chance of succeeding. It makes no sense to say such people react spontaneously. Their reactions being a result of practice, they should be qualified as automatic or mechanical and there are systems (ABS, TCS (or ASR), ESC) – we call them mechanisms – that reduce the level of risk in such situations.

Imagine two fugitives from a concentration camp right on the run: one of them is injured and cannot run any more, so he asks his fellow to kill him and run on his own – the fellow has no time to reflect². That is arguably quite like an existential decision, similar to J.-P. Sartre's story about a young man who asked him if he should join the French Resistance and so leave his old sick mother uncared for, or to stay with his mother and so not join the Resistance. Sartre thought that was truly a choice between plague and cholera. In the latter case though the young man had more time to reflect: he could, for instance, come back to ask Sartre about that once more.

This brings me to what can be my definitions: *feeling* is an immediate and spontaneous taking of position, while *thought* is a delayed taking of position (this latter because it results from calculation, in an extreme case from *ad*

¹ I have not come across any definition of feeling and thought in terms of time. In fact, a definition of what feeling and thought are is not easy to find. Notice that the former is often defined in relation to the latter and therefore considered as negative. See e.g. A. Schopenhauer, *The World As Will and Representation*, § 52, vol. 1, transl. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, Inc., New York 1969, p. 262: *All possible efforts, stirrings, and manifestations of the will, all the events that occur within man himself and are included by the reasoning faculty in the wide, negative concept of feeling [...]*. Remarkably, this passage was quoted *in extenso* by F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, § 16. An example can be E. R. Dodds' book's title, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Beacon Press, Beacon Hill, Boston 1957. See also M. Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, transl. M. S. Frings, R. L. Funk, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, p. 253: *Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice [...] consist[ing] in upholding the division between "reason" and "sensibility" [...] This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational – that is not order, law, and the like – to sensibility. Thus our whole emotional life – and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate – must be assigned to "sensibility"*. As Scheler observes, p. 254, no one examined the basis of such a prejudice, for instance *whether there is also a pure intuiting and feeling, a pure loving and hating, a pure striving and willing*. I checked the entry *Emotion* in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: time is not taken into account in probing the essence of emotion.

² As reported by Tadeusz Płuzański.

libitum calculation). This seems a plausible idea as making a calculation takes *more* time than not making any calculation, provided that you compare the same agent acting under the same circumstances in respect to the same thing. Even more, it complies with the fact that when I am asked to explain, in retrospect, my taking of a position, the opposite relation holds true. As to my position being an effect of my thinking (resp. calculation) I have an explanation at hand, but in order to find out, or to put into words, the reasons of my position resulting from feeling I need time to reflect. So, the difference between thinking and feeling lies in time: with time passing by, a position that initially was a feeling, acquires its new character, that of a thought, and, a fortiori, loses the character of feeling. Theoretically, at least, we could say that what presents the maximum of immediacy – a response without any time required or even possible – is *pure* feeling.

In a similar vein, I propose to read the famous *rule* of Ribot stating that *every feeling loses its strength in the measure that it becomes intellectualised*¹, first to read it not only in its dimension of temporality understood as human life (childhood – youth – adulthood – old age), but also in the sense of the moment of any concrete situation: *with the passage of time, a position loses its affectivity and gains in reflection*. Then, I suggest to deduce from this the following corollary: *Any feeling loses in power and any thought gains in power with the flow of time, or again: the shorter the time, the weaker the thought and the stronger the feeling*. So far, so good.

Alas, the prospect of considering *pure* feeling and *pure* thought is too theoretical, too rigid, and this for two reasons, if no more. First, the length of time that should be a factor of differentiation is extremely difficult to determine, so to say. It is unclear how to measure a period as short *enough*, or for how long we still deal with a *lack* of time. On the other hand, what period of time is the longest one, the time that cannot be surpassed by an even longer period? If lack of time is equivalent to the immediacy of response and its cause², the shortest time will be a tiny fraction of a second. But a longer period is much more difficult to measure, for how can you determine a point at which time can be said to be long *enough*. Finally, there is an objection to be made: unless there is a simultaneity, a *fraction* of a second does pass. Therefore the difference between simultaneity and immediacy only *seems* to be slight. In reality, it is huge: any shortest lapse of time is *time* passed. This is similar to Pascal's distinction between the longest time and eternity. The longest time compared with eternity is essentially the same as the shortest time compared with simultaneity: they are patently different categories.

Moreover, next to the technical difficulty of determining a period of time from which a taking of position is no longer spontaneous and with no affective content at all, another, even more disconcerting, difficulty exists. The

¹ Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, transl. (?), The Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd., London 1897, p. 19.

² For an analysis of simultaneity, continuity and causality see R. Ingarden, *Quelques remarques sur la relation de causalité* in: *Studia Philosophica. Commentarii Societatis Philosophorum Polonorum* 3, 1947, pp. 151–166, esp. pp. 159 sq.

supposed opposition between a moment when there is *no* thought *yet* and a moment when thought has *already* removed any affective element turns out to be apparent, as can be the case when a thought has *already* appeared in a very short time and, on the other hand, a feeling *still* persists and has *not yet* declined completely after a long interval of time. The speed of calculation can in practice be higher or lower, as can the ability to keep spontaneity *alive*: this varies from case to case, being bigger or smaller. Consequently, spontaneity proves to be fading more or less rapidly.

The image of *pure* thinking that comes to my mind is that of a chess game. As it seems, a chess player is fully engrossed in calculating various scenarios and the better he is as a player the more quickly he reacts. In the extreme case, a world champion playing with an amateur will make his moves immediately. This is not to say that he reacts spontaneously. Each of his moves is an outcome of an extremely quick calculation, since the gap between his technique and that of his rival is enormous. But what happened during a game in which Garry Kasparov confronted a computer? In May 1997 Kasparov lost the game. Apparently, he didn't remain calm and was affected by emotions, while the computer stayed emotionless. Why? Because, as everyone knows, what is in question in a chess game is time – you cannot spend as much time as you want for taking your decision¹. And in January 2003,

[a]fter reaching a decent position Kasparov offered a draw, which was soon returned by the Deep Junior team. Asked why he offered the draw, Kasparov said he feared (sic!) making a blunder.²

A fairly similar image can be found in the following passage from Antiphon the Sophist:

ὅστις δὲ ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὸν πλησίον κακῶς ποιήσων δειμαίνει, μὴ ἃ θέλει ποιῆσαι ἁμαρτῶν τούτων ἃ μὴ θέλει ἀπενέγκηται, σωφρονέστερος. ἐν ᾧ γὰρ δειμαίνει, μέλλει· ἐν ᾧ δὲ μέλλει, πολλάκις ὁ διὰ μέσου χρόνος ἀπέστρεψε τὸν νοῦν τῶν θελημάτων· [...] ³ (he who is about to harm his fellow is afraid of failing in what he wants – he is more moderate. Where he is scared, he defers. Where he defers, an interval will often turn his noos⁴ away from his intention [...]).

¹ Other examples such as the psychoanalytical examination where the time of responses allows the analyst to identify areas where censorship occurs or a TV show in which respondents provide answers more or less rapidly could also be considered for this purpose.


² http://www.biographicon.com/view/u7phb/Garry_Kasparov. See e.g. N. Troubat, M.-A. Fargeas-Gluck, M. Tulppo & B. Dugué, *The stress of chess players as a model to study the effects of psychological oxidation and heart rate variability in man* in: *European Journal of Applied Physiology* 105, 2009, pp. 343–349, esp. because of measurement of 10 adjectives assessing positive affectivity and 10 assessing negative affectivity which describe different feelings and emotions. *Participants* – in this case chess players – described their present feelings on a five point scale (p. 344). I thank Piotr Daszkiewicz from Service du Patrimoine Naturel, Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle in Paris for indicating to me this paper.

³ Antiphon the Sophist, DK 87 B 58.

⁴ DK: *Sinn* | Morrison: *mind* | Freeman: *mind* | Untersteiner: *proposito* | Poirier: *esprit* | Pendrick: *mind*.

Notice that being afraid is bound up with reflection. Time passes, but from the very first moment a man, fearing he may not succeed in what he wants to obtain, defers, and that, in turn, results in a change of mind. The longer the man refrains from action, the longer his fear sustains and the more his thinking is involved. To some extent, these processes run simultaneously, so the more you think, the more afraid you are¹. If you make your resolution immediately, even should it afterwards turn out to have been wrong, you shed your fear. Therefore, in the case pictured by Antiphon you cannot distinguish neatly the realms of fearing and of thinking. Here you face an intention to be carried out, with fear superposed thereupon, and the effect of such superposition is a delayed decision. Or, to put differently, what produces the delay is the man's feeling, which touches off a calculation. The longer the calculation, the bigger the delay gets and the bigger the likelihood of a change of mind. If neither Aristotle nor Antiphon determined the exact value of time confining themselves to expressions such as *certain* (τινα χρόνον – Aristotle) and *in the meantime* (διὰ μέσου χρόνος – Antiphon the Sophist), this is because, I think, a strict delimitation of time in differentiating feeling and thinking is hardly possible.

Accordingly, a schema where the successive lines describe acts less and less affective and more and more reflective



seems to provide but an approximate and simplified picture. As a matter of fact, in the first case (of *pure* feeling) thinking may *already* be involved and in the fourth, fifth and sixth feeling may *not yet* be fully extinguished. As, indeed, there are, on the one hand, *immediate* thoughts and, on the other hand, abiding and deep feelings which are *lingering* for a long time and which, for this very reason, are *the basis of identity and of character*’ “*the man is hidden*

¹ The reason of this can be that – according to J. Elster, *Emotional Choice and Rational Choice* in: *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 278–279 – *the mind abhors a vacuum, hence the need for cognitive closure*.

² The point of maximum of delay (= minimum of spontaneity) is hard to fix on the line.

in the heart and not in the head."¹ or which *in spite of successive transformations last several years or even decades*², another difficulty arises, namely: how to apprehend such lasting feelings, if, in my definition, *feeling* is an immediate and spontaneous taking of a position? Although several options are in view³ – either their spontaneity disappears and so they are but automatic; or they are composed of a series of acts of taking a position, each of which is, by itself, fixed in a point in time, immediate and spontaneous; or, finally, an abiding feeling is an uninterrupted series of spontaneities⁴ – instead of looking for a *pure* feeling and a *pure* thought, I am at present inclined to view feeling and thought as an indissoluble nexus of feeling and thought: an indivisible linkage feeling–thought⁵. A previously suggested smoothness of passage from feeling to thinking is now to be meant as their indisociability. Its two components are analyzable *in crudo* but only to the extent Descartes' idea of *no mountain without a valley*⁶ is⁷.

More recently the pattern was elaborated by Otto Weininger in whose account there is neither *man* nor *woman* in pure form. In what follows, I am going to apply his description to *feeling* and *thinking* in paraphrasing *man* (M) and *woman* (W) by *feeling* (F) and *thinking* (T), respectively, as well as other words if necessary (they are underlined and the English translation of the original text is given in a footnote):

Amongst psychical acts the state of the case is as follows: There exist all sorts of intermediate conditions between feeling– and thinking–transitional

¹ Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 440.

² J. Mazurkiewicz, *Zarys fizjologicznej teorii uczuć*, part 1, Wydawnictwo "Rocznika Psychjatrzyznego", Warszawa 1930, p. 33.

³ I have tried to develop this point in *Affectivity in its relation to time* [unpublished], a paper presented at a Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, University College Dublin, July 9–12, 2010.

⁴ This last alternative is suggested by Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way* in: M. Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, transl. C. K. Scott Moncrieff & T. Kilmartin, vol. 1, Vintage Books, London 2005, p. 448:

For what we suppose to be our love or our jealousy is never a single, continuous and indivisible passion. It is composed of an infinity of successive loves, of different jealousies, each of which is ephemeral, although by their uninterrupted multiplicity they give us the impression of continuity, the illusion of unity.

⁵ It can also be called an affective–reflective atomic unit. For more on the feeling–thought linkage see R. Zaborowski, *Feeling–Thought Linkage and its Forms in the Ancient and Modern Times* in: *Greek philosophy and the issues of our age*, t. 1, (eds) K. Boudouris & M. Adam, Ionia Publications, Athens 2009, pp. 230–240 and R. Zaborowski, *Feeling or thought – both or neither of them?* in: *Classical Bulletin*, Special Issue *Truth, Fiction, and Reality*, 2010 [forthcoming]. A hyphenation is used in order to underline that several factors are — as termed by V. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield 1954, p. 32 – *interfused*. However, it is manifest that – to follow J. Hillman, *Emotion. A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meaning for Therapy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1960, p. 148 – the hyphen is enigmatic and [a]n investigation of that hyphen [...] is an enormous job.

⁶ See R. Descartes, *Meditations metaphysiques* V, 79 [1647] in: R. Descartes, *Œuvres de Descartes*, vol. 9, (eds) C. Adam & P. Tannery, J. Vrin, Paris 1957, p. 52.

⁷ The idea is neither mine nor new. In 20th century it was advocated, among others, by R. G. Collingwood, J. Macmurray, V. J. McGill, J. Hillman. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason*, p. viii, refers, in turn, to Spinoza [who] showed, even more clearly, that emotions involve reason and reason, emotions [...].

forms. [...] we may suppose the existence of an ideal feeling, *F*, and of an ideal thinking, *T*, as psychic types, although these types do not actually exist. Such types not only can be constructed, but must be constructed. [...] The intermediate conditions actually existing between the two absolute states of matter serve merely as a starting-point for investigation of the “types” and in the practical application of the theory are treated as mixture and exhaustively analysed. So also there exist only the intermediate stages between absolute feeling and thinking, the absolute conditions never presenting themselves.¹

And we can carry on as far as to follow his definition:

The fact is that feeling and thinking are like two substances combined in different proportions, but with either element never wholly missing. We find, so to speak, never either a feeling or a thinking, but only the feeling condition and the thinking condition. Any individual [act], “A” or “B,” is never to be designed merely as a feeling or a thinking, but by a formula showing that it is a composite of feeling and thinking characters in different proportions, for instance, as follows:

$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 & \alpha F & \beta T \\
 A = & & B = \\
 & \alpha T & \beta F
 \end{array}$$

always remembering that each of the factors, α , α' , β , β' , must be greater than 0 and less than unity. [end of quote]².

¹ O. Weininger, *Sex and Character*, authorised transl. from the 6th German edition, A. L. Burt Company, New York – Chicago 1903 [?], p. 7:

*Amongst human beings the state of the case is as follows: There exist all sorts of intermediate conditions between male- and female-transitional forms. [...] we may suppose the existence of an ideal man, *M*, and of an ideal woman, *W*, as sexual types, although these types do not actually exist. Such types not only can be constructed, but must be constructed. [...] The intermediate conditions actually existing between the two absolute states of matter serve merely as a starting-point for investigation of the “types” and in the practical application of the theory are treated as mixture and exhaustively analysed. So also there exist only the intermediate stages between absolute males and females, the absolute conditions never presenting themselves.*

² O. Weininger, *Sex and Character*, p. 8:

The fact is that males and females are like two substances combined in different proportions, but with either element never wholly missing. We find, so to speak, never either a man or a woman, but only the male condition and the female condition. Any individual, “A” or “B,” is never to be designed merely as a man or a woman, but by a formula showing that it is a composite of male and female characters in different proportions, for instance, as follows:

