

Robert Zaborowski (University of Warmia & Mazury)[♦]

TWO NEGLECTED DETAILS IN PLATO'S CHARIOT ALLEGORY*

Abstract. This paper is the first of two discussing several problems in Plato's allegory of the soul in the *Phaedrus*. I revisit the description of what goes on in the lover's soul when he approaches and encounters the beloved (253e5–255a1), because I think that crucial issues arising from the description have been neglected or misinterpreted so far and that crucial passages have been mistranslated. After considering two minor points concerning (i) the evil of the black horse and the origin of the soul's fall and (ii) the white horse's capacity to restrain itself, the more substantive issue of *neglected details* is then addressed. The first detail taken up is the meaning of *the whole soul* in 253e5 and the second pertains to Plato's description of *memory as falling backwards* in 254b5. An analysis of Plato's text leads to a conclusion that the simple model of a tripartite soul, in the way it is commonly attributed to Plato, is not supported by the *Phaedrus*. The interpretation of both neglected details instead gives support to the thesis that, on the one hand, the three elements of the soul are each functionally complex and, on the other, each function is ascribed to more than one element of the Platonic soul.

Keywords: Plato, chariot allegory, (the whole) soul, memory, two-level structure of the soul.

I Introduction

The title above is a paraphrase of Jacques Brunschwig's title in a paper of

[♦] Address for correspondence: IF UWM, Obița 1, 10725 Olsztyn, Poland. Email: thymos2001@yahoo.fr.

^{*} I had started working on what has now become this paper over 20 years ago. Some elements were contained in my PhD thesis (1998) and in several works published since then (e.g. R. Zaborowski, *Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques*, pp. 140–144). The research during which the paper was written in Vandœuvre, Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Utrecht was funded respectively by the Foundation Hardt, the De Brzezic Lanckoroński Foundation, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Short versions of this paper were given in Edinburgh, Madrid, Glasgow, and Cagliari. This paper as it is presented here is a first part of what has become too long to be published in one piece. I hope to publish the second part of it – *Plato's Phdr. 253e5–255a1 revisited* – soon. I am grateful to Tadeusz Kobierzycki, the late Jacques Brunschwig, the late Scott Austin, Douglas L. Cairns, Anthony W. Price, Purificación Sánchez Zamorano, and, last not least, Kostas Kalimtzis for their comments and remarks.

his dealing with Plato's cave¹. In the present paper, by analogy with Brunschwig's article on the *Republic*, I shall speak about some neglected points in the well-known chariot allegory in the *Phaedrus*². I am well aware that speaking about overlooked aspects in the chariot allegory, so repeatedly commented on, might seem odd. Nonetheless, I modestly assume – as Brunschwig did in his analysis of the cave³ – that there are neglected details in the chariot allegory. Given the fact that the allegory has been commented on by so many authors, it is striking that the aspects I mean to highlight had been either improperly explained or not analyzed at all. Moreover, since they constitute, in my view, substantial elements of the allegory, it might appear as though interpretations of the chariot allegory had commonly been based on a deformed reading of Plato's text. This, again, might be significant inasmuch as the interpretation of the allegory has often⁴ been read as an important piece in accounting for Plato's psychology in general. I need to add a *proviso*, however: this paper is about the *Phaedrus*. I deliberately confine myself to speaking about Plato's *Phaedrus*' psychology without discussing if and how Plato's view in this dialogue can or does fit his views on the soul expressed in other dialogues, for instance the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*⁵. For one thing – I cannot underline it too much – the *Phaedrus* is radically different from other dialogues in what Plato claims about the soul: *it is unoriginated* (246a1: ἀγέννητόν). The two places I intend to focus on here both belong to the description of what goes on in the lover's soul when he approaches and encounters the beloved (253e5–255a1); such description is a part of Socrates'

¹ See J. Brunschwig, *Un détail négligé dans la caverne de Platon*. Brunschwig reconsidered the issue in: *Revisiting Plato's Cave*, where he took into account some of remarks made on the earlier version of his paper. For a further discussion of the *cave detail* see R. Zaborowski, *Sur un certain détail négligé dans la caverne de Platon*.

² With the difference that in the cave there is indeed, as observed by J. Brunschwig, *Revisiting Plato's Cave*, p. 171, a kind of isolation of the element that has been subsequently neglected by the commentators. Contrariwise, in the passages of the *Phaedrus*, which I shall discuss, there is no isolation of elements in question.

³ I can but take up Brunschwig's words, p. 145: *The number of books, chapters and papers devoted to it is enormous; I do not claim to know them all, still less to have read them all*.

⁴ Often because sometimes the *Phaedrus* is quite simply not taken into consideration. For example, a recent collection of papers *Plato and the Divided Self*, (eds.) R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brittain does not take the *Phaedrus* into account as it would deserve since the volume does not contain a separate treatment of that dialogue. Same for *Études platoniciennes*, vol. 4: *Les puissances de l'âme selon Platon*, where none of the 17 papers treats the *Phaedrus* in the same way as the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, etc. Leaving out the *Phaedrus* is significant inasmuch as the *Phaedrus* complicates any systematic presentation of Plato's view on the soul expounded in both, an earlier dialogue – the *Republic* – and a later one – the *Timaeus*. See for example P. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, p. 77 who insists on the fact that the *Phaedrus*' account is of exceptional character.

⁵ A distinctive feature of the *Phaedrus*' account would be that, e.g. in the *Republic* the division of the soul is developed in an analytical language, while in the *Phaedrus* we are dealing with an allegory. Next, in the *Republic* the description is about what the structure of the soul is like, while the *Phaedrus* displays how the soul acts in a process. Yet, there is no universal agreement as to whether both descriptions are compatible with one another. E.g. A. W. Price, *Parts of the Soul in Plato's Phaedrus* (unpublished, quoted with permission) is sceptical about this and already in *Reason's New Role in the Phaedrus*, p. 243 A. W. Price is reluctant to identify the charioteer with *to logistikon*: *reason [...] is never called «the rational» part (to logistikon), but, colourlessly, «mind» (nous, 247c8), or «thought» (dianoia, d1)*. See also F. Sheffield, *Erôs before and after tripartition*, p. 222: *[...] the three desires of the Phaedrus do not map exactly onto those of the Republic*. But Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, p. 193 is clear: "Ι π π ο υ ς οὖν λαμβάνει θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ νοητικὸν δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς.

argument about the soul (245c5–257a2) in his second speech, known as Socrates' palinode (243e9–257b6).

Socrates' argument about the soul starts with a proof of its immortality and then he passes on to the soul's real essence¹. To this end Socrates introduces an allegory, a step that he justifies as follows:

*To tell what it [i.e. the soul] really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure.*²

The allegory contains an image in which [w]e will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer³. Thus, Plato emphasizes that one cannot speak about the soul's essence directly, but only approximately, *as it seems* (ὡς δὲ ἔοικεν) being opposed expressly to *as it is* (οἷον μὲν ἔστι)⁴.

The first description of the soul as a chariot is brief (no more than 7 lines, i.e. 246a6–b4, plus two other sentences in 247b3–5 & e4–6⁵). Then, Plato touches upon a distinction between a mortal and an immortal living being⁶ and the reason for a soul losing its wings⁷, and depicts the realm above the

¹ See 246a3–4: τῆς ιδέας αὐτῆς. See also 247c7: οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα. P. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, p. 87 observed that while the proof of the immortality of the soul is provided by way of dialectics, its essence is presented by way of myth: *Platon traite donc successivement deux questions qu'il distingue avec le plus grand soin: l'immortalité, puis la nature de l'âme. Sur la première, il affirme et démontre. Mais dès qu'il aborde la seconde, le ton change et nous avertit que la dialectique vient de faire place au mythe.*

² Transl. H. N. Fowler, 246a4–6: οἷον μὲν ἔστι, πάντη πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρῶς διηγήσεως, ὡς δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος: ταύτη οὖν λέγωμεν. Some wonder if the account is to be taken seriously, e.g. B. Jowett, *Introduction to Phaedrus*, p. 410: *Then follows the famous myth, which is a sort of parable, and like other parables ought not to receive too minute an interpretation. In all such allegories there is a great deal which is merely ornamental, and the interpreter has to separate the important from the unimportant.* See also J. Cazeaux, *Commentaire*, p. 373: *Il faut ici se garder de trop connaître Platon. Bien sûr, il est aisé d'identifier chacun des trois partenaires de l'attelage, le cocher et chacun des deux coursiers. Mais que le Phèdre suive ou précède les autres paraboles de l'âme en sa tripartition, il faut laisser au Phèdre le bénéfice de sa légèreté, ou à Socrate celui de son ironie.*

³ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 246a6–7: ἐοικέτω δὴ συμφύτω δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἠνιόχου. This image is a different one from what we meet usually, e.g. in the *Iliad*: a chariot is typically composed of two men, a warrior and his charioteer and servant (*therapon*), and two horses (e.g. VIII, 113–129; this is, of course, not the case of chariots in a race organized by Achilles, book XXIII). Some alludes to Parmenides's image (see DK 28 B 1, 1–2: ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι, / πέμπτον, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσα) – yet, in Parmenides there are mares in a undetermined number and he who is supposed to be driver is not driving but is driven either by mares or by his own *thumos*. I would say that mares are driving force and *thumos* is determining its range. As to direction, it is indicated by maidens (v. 5). Moreover, in Plato's account both horses are winged.

⁴ There is nothing exceptional in describing the mental in allegoric terms. See e.g. D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* II, III, III, p. 415: *We speak not strictly and philosophically [when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason].* As for Plato's passage opinions varies, e.g. R. Woolf, *How to see an unencrusted soul*, p. 154, n. 6 focuses on the cautionary character of Plato's words *contra* R. Kamtekar, *Speak with the same voice as reason*, p. 99 who takes Plato's "likely" to mean "compatible with what the truth must be". As for F. Sheffield, *Erôs before and after tripartition*, p. 224: *This image is, at any rate, not designed to capture the nature of the soul, but how it seems (246a).*

⁵ Here with regard to god's chariot.

⁶ 246b5: θνητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶον.

⁷ 246d4: αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς.

heaven¹ and the life of gods². Next, he passes on to *other souls*³ and presents a *law of Destiny*⁴. Finally, Plato speaks about the contemplation and remembrance of beauty⁵, the origin and experience of love⁶ and the species of love according to the god one follows⁷. At 253c7 Plato takes up again the threefold division of the soul and develops his allegorical account:

[i]n the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three: two forms of horses, and one form of a charioteer. Let us retain this division⁸.

One should notice that, as a matter of fact, what Plato says is not that there are two horses and a charioteer but that the three elements possess forms of these kinds: two being horse-like forms and the third being a charioteer form⁹. He then focuses on what the excellence of the good horse and the evil of the bad horse consist in¹⁰. The description of both horses is antithetical and goes from 253d3 to e5 (less than 9 lines, almost as many dedicated to the good horse as to the bad one). From then on Plato expounds what happens to the lover when he approaches and encounters his beloved. In his account Plato considers the lover either in his entirety or in his complexity¹¹.

Before I enter into the matter of what, in my opinion, are two neglected details in the account, let me take up two minor points which, typically, are either inaccurately analyzed or not emphasized at all. These two points will

¹ 247c3: ὑπερουράνιον τόπον.

² 248a1: Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος.

³ 248a1: αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί. It can be wondered if these souls are the same souls that are called immortal (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι) at 247b6. Such seems to be the opinion of H. Yunis, *Commentary in: Plato, Phaedrus*, p. 142: *human souls* (cf. 247b5 [...], *who follow, insofar as they can, one or another of the divine contingents that constitute the procession up towards the top of heaven* [...]).

⁴ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 248c2: Θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὁδε.

⁵ See 249d5–6: τὸ τῆδέ τις ὄρων κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμνησκόμενος.

⁶ See 252c2: ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων.

⁷ See 252d1: καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής.

⁸ Transl. H. N. Fowler (modified: I modify by omitting *parts* – in Greek we read about *division in three* (τριχῆ)), 253c8–d 1: Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῆ διείλομεν ψυχήν ἐκάστην, ἵππομόρφω μὲν δύο τινὲ εἶδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἐτι ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενέτω.

⁹ See *Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer*, p. 186: *Since their earlier significance has now in a way been changed, he does not simply say, as previously, “the charioteer and horses,” but rather, the charioteerlike species and the forms of the horses.* (Ficino’s underlining)

¹⁰ See 253d1–3: τῶν δὲ δὴ ἵππων ὁ μὲν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὐ̄ ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ̄ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do.*)

¹¹ In the passage which I shall examine there is a clear-cut distinction between two perspectives, the lover or the whole soul versus the charioteer and the two horses; but in what precedes both plans – comparandum and comparans – are combined, since we read that *of the other souls, that which best* [...] *raises the head of the charioteer* (248a1–2, transl. H. N. Fowler). See also 248a4–6 (*which* [...] *troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another* [soul] *sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it* [i.e. the head of the charioteer] *sees some things and fails to see others*, transl. H. N. Fowler).

constitute the bulk of the present introduction. The first is that it is usually taken tacitly for granted that the evil of the soul comes from the bad horse. But this is not accurate. Although it is said in the first description that, of two horses, one is good and the second is the opposite and that the horse that participates in evil weighs the soul down¹, this is not said unqualifiedly. For, as we can read, the horses as well as the charioteers of the gods are good and made of good stuff and only non-gods' chariots are composed of a mixed quality². But what does this mean? Surely not that charioteers and horses are of mixed quality. Rather, as Socrates says, it means that one of the horses is good and the second is of opposite character. What about the non-gods' chariots' charioteer? If he is good, is he as good as the charioteer of god-soul? More questions: does the difference between a god and a human chariot amount to the difference in one of the horses, or should we interpret that the difference also resides in the charioteers' different constitution, the latter being less powerful and skilled in the driving of human chariots? Perhaps a god-chariot does not fall because both its charioteer is able to keep the chariot firmly under control and the horses are obedient³. Next, what does it mean that *first the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair*⁴? Should we think that in gods' chariot this is different in that the charioteers of the gods are not drivers or that they do not drive a pair? Both readings would be odd given Plato's most general description of the soul, i.e. *the soul being a composite nature composed of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer*⁵.

But why then do some human composites fall down while others do not? Is that only because of the evil of the bad horse? Maybe not. For although the bad horse partakes in weighing the whole composite down, this is not what determines the composite's fall. This happens only insofar as the charioteer did not bring the bad horse up well⁶. Accordingly, the evil of the bad horse is effective only when it is badly trained and hence it is the charioteer who is to be blamed insofar as he has trained it badly. Of course, the horses⁷ do not

¹ See 247b3–5: βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ καλῶς ἦν τεθραμμένος τῶν ἠνιόχων. (transl. H. N. Fowler modified: *the horse participating in the evil weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained*.) One could wonder what *participating in the evil* refers to? Is it so because of its being badly trained? Or is there room for a horse to participate in evil and still not be badly trained? I should here also remark that in 247b4 βαρύνων, which is a *weighing down*, results from the horse's participation in evil. In 248c5 & 8 βαρυνθῆ and βαρυνθεισα pertain to the entire soul, i.e. the charioteer together with the horses. They are all dragged down by their inability to remain in the right course: ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδη, καὶ τινὶ συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη λήθῃς τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεισα βαρυνθῆ, βαρυνθεισα δὲ πτερορροπήσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ (transl. H. N. Fowler: *but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth*).

² See 246a7–b1: θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἠνιόχοι πάντες αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμικται.

³ See 247b1–2: τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται.

⁴ 246b1–2: πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων συνωρίδος ἠνιοχεῖ.

⁵ See above, 246a6–7.

⁶ See above, 247b4–5.

⁷ Here Plato's saying unqualifiedly *by the horses* makes no distinction between the good and the bad horse.

make it easier and cause a general disturbance¹. But Plato is explicit enough as to the effect of *the evil of the charioteer*² which makes souls maimed or their wings broken³. This is the very reason why

*they [i.e. souls] all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion*⁴.

It would be, therefore, correct to say, or so it seems to me, that the fall of the soul in these cases results from the charioteer's weakness and not from the evil of the bad horse.

Furthermore, an attentive reader will notice that Plato, when he speaks about the excellence of the soul, refers once to what is the best in the soul⁵ (let us call it the best element⁶ of the soul), nourished with the truth it finds on the plain⁷, and once he speaks – in the passage that immediately follows – of the (whole) soul⁸, which becomes lighter and lighter by means of what it eats. If this is so, it can be inferred that the charioteer is most responsible for the entire soul's doings, the bad horse's actions included. What makes him drive badly is his poor cognitive condition, more precisely the fact that he *is filled with forgetfulness and evil*⁹. It should be noticed, however, that the charioteer's *forgetfulness and evil* are secondary to his being already in a bad

¹ 248a4–6: θορυβουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα τὰ ὄντα: ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρεν, τοτὲ δ' ἔδυ, βιαζομένων δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὐ. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *which [...] troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others.*)

² 248b2: κακία ἡνιόχων.

³ See 248b3: πολλὰ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλὰ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται.

⁴ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 248b4–5: ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῆ δοξασιῆ χρώονται.

⁵ See 248b7: ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ.

⁶ Plato does use the term εἶδη (253c8).

⁷ See 248b5–c1: οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐ ἔστιν, ἡ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there.*)

⁸ See 248c1–2: ἡ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this.*)

⁹ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 248c7: λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα. A comment by F. Sheffield, *Erôs before and after tripartition*, p. 233 who claims that [t]he original fall and condition of the soul is explained by some accident, or mischance, which fills us with “forgetfulness and incompetence” (240c6[sic!]) seems to be too general a claim, because in fact this accident happens, first, only to those souls which are already (see below) in a bad condition and, second, more particularly to what is represented in the soul by the charioteer and not to the soul as such, let alone us, as Sheffield says. More accurate is what she claims on p. 233: [t]he condition of our souls is ultimately determined by reason [...], provided she takes reason as identified with the charioteer (which is the case, see p. 227: the activity of reason (viz., dianoia/the charioteer)). Better is H. Yunis, *Commentary*, p. 144: the “deficiency” which afflicts this soul refers both to the charioteers’s inability to manage his team and to the defects of character that damage the wings, encumber the soul, and send it downward. And much better E. Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 479, n. 20: *Acc. to the account in Phdr. 246 C, the soul suffers its downfall into the earthly existence if ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος, i.e. the ἐπιθυμία in the soul, tends towards the earth – 247 B. It must, therefore, be the result of the preponderance of the appetitive impulses. This, however, can only happen if the λογιστικόν of the soul has become too weak to drive the soul–chariot any longer as its duty was. [...] It is thus a weakening of the cognitive part of the soul that causes its downfall [...]* (underlining is mine).

condition which consists in his *inability to follow*¹, this inability resulting, it seems, from *the evil of the drivers*² and their *powerlessness*³. All of this means that the role of a human chariot's bad horse's evil must be revised. Such evil is constitutional and, as such, the bad horse engrosses the charioteer into controlling and restraining it, but the bad horse does not play the crucial role in the soul's condition. Its responsibility is fifth in the order of reasons after the charioteer's (1) powerlessness, then (2) his evil, then (3) his forgetfulness and a secondary evil that results from this lapse, and, finally (4) his training of the bad horse. It should be noticed that the same word, *κακία*⁴, is applied once to the bad horse and twice to the charioteer, but the evil of the latter is prior in the order of causes of how the whole chariot is travelling while the evil of the former has a significant impact only insofar as it has been badly trained⁵. Hence, the bad horse should not be given the full responsibility for a chariot's possible demise. All in all, it is the charioteer's actions, either direct or indirect, which condition the fall of the chariot. So much then for the bad horse's impact on the way soul as a whole functions.

One should also appreciate – and this is the second point I want to take up in this Introduction – that the good horse, the third element of the human chariot, does not engross the charioteer's attention, in the manner discussed above, at all⁶. This is because of its peculiar capacity to restrain itself:

*the horse that is obedient to the charioteer,
constrained then as always by modesty, controls
himself and does not leap upon the beloved*⁷.

Usually, this feature of the good horse is not commented upon or, when it is, it is not duly stressed⁸. Ferrari, for example, who refers to the passage above writes:

¹ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 248c5–6: ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπείσθαι.

² Transl. H. N. Fowler, 248b2: κακία ἡνιόχων.

³ 248a7: ἀδυνατοῦσαι δέ.

⁴ The bad horse is not called so nor its evil is mentioned before 253d3 where Plato says what its evil consists in. So far we are only told that it is opposite to the good horse (in 246b3) and that it is participating in the evil (in 247b3).

⁵ In both cases, 247b4 and 248c5 & 8, participation of the bad horse in evil and evil of the charioteer is what makes the whole chariot go down.

⁶ Nor in any other either.

⁷ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 254a1–3: ὁ μὲν εὐπειθῆς τῷ ἡνιόχῳ τῶν ἵππων, ἀεὶ τε καὶ τότε αἰδοῖ βιαζόμενος, ἑαυτὸν κατέχει μὴ ἐπιτηδᾶν τῷ ἔρωμένῳ.

⁸ I think about those who insist on comparing the good horse to the *thumoeides* of the *Republic*. This is because to *thumoeides*, although called the *logistikos's ally* (*Rep.* 441e6: συμμάχῳ τούτου), is *the helper of to logistikos by nature* (transl. P. Shorey modified, *Rep.* 441a2–3: ἐπίκουρον ὄν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει), unless *it is corrupted by evil nurture* (transl. P. Shorey, *Rep.* 441a3: ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρή), while we never hear about the good horse siding with the bad horse or the good horse being badly trained (what is actually the case of the bad horse, see above). E.g. O. Renaut, *Platon. La médiation des émotions*, pp. 175–176 goes as far as to claim that *ce n'est que par les pôles de la raison et du désir que l'on peut cerner cette notion d'intermédiaire [...] il semble qu'il faille renoncer à vouloir définir le θυμός indépendamment des concepts de raison et de désir qui le déterminent*. For, in the *Phaedrus* the good horse is not ambiguous in his doings. Renaut (p. 205), neutralizes the autonomy of the good horse by saying that [t]out se passe donc comme si le bon cheval désignait par métonymie l'individu tout entier, et plus particulièrement l'âme dans sa relation au corps.

The good horse, we are told, can be led by word of command alone and never needs the whip (253d7–e1) [...] After all, the sense of shame even in the good horse ‘forces’ him, we read, into modest behaviour (aidoi biazomenos, 254a2).¹

As it is, Ferrari focusses on the good horse’s obedience to the charioteer and its sense of shame. Yet, by way of insisting on *force and compulsion* [...] *in the scene*² and by leaving aside the general character (*always as well as then*)³ of the good horse’s being compelled to (follow) αἰδώς⁴, and, especially, of its actual act of restraining itself, Ferrari loses sight of the autonomy of the good horse’s restraint, or better, of its self-restraint.

One could probably say that Ferrari’s remark suggests that the good horse’s self-control results from its commitment to αἰδώς which, in turn, results from its obedience to the charioteer. If this is so, this would suggest a sequential order of features going from the more general to more particular. But there is an obvious problem with this account which attributes the horse’s conduct to obedience or submission to the commands of the charioteer. Although there is no mention of either the good horse’s not controlling itself and still being obedient to the charioteer or of the good horse’s controlling itself and not being obedient any longer to the charioteer, we can assume that, despite a general obedience, a singular case of not being obedient is not implausible. Obedience entails the possibility of disobedience. This is what Plato allows us to think since he sets the *always and then* character of the good horse’s αἰδώς and specifies that the good horse controls itself. In fact what he emphasizes is that in this very particular moment the good horse is controlling itself (and not only being obedient to the charioteer). Moreover, Plato does not mention any action of the charioteer (coercive or otherwise) that would trigger or stimulate the good horse’s self-control.

The self-control of the good horse is indicative of its autonomy. Consequently, the good horse is autonomous, even if only in one respect and even if only partly, i.e. restraining itself from leaping on the beloved. It is true that, given the *Phaedrus*’ context, it is not easy to decide whether the good horse is coordinated causally with the charioteer or whether their feeling, acting, and behaving are simply simultaneous. But even if we were to grant, in order of time, that the good horse first obeys the charioteer and – either only then or at the same time – is compelled to follow αἰδώς, and that only after such obedience it becomes able to control itself, the result remains that the good horse is controlling itself because it has interiorized the charioteer’s order in and through an organizing principle called αἰδώς⁵. As to whether it

¹ G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, pp. 186–187.

² G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, p. 187.

³ 254a2: αἰεί τε καὶ τότε.

⁴ See *LSJ*: αἰδώς [...] as a moral feeling [...] reverence, awe respect for the feeling or opinion of others or for one’s own conscience, and so shame, self-respect. For an overview of interpretations see R. Zaborowski, *La crainte et le courage dans l’Iliade et l’Odyssée*, pp. 119–126.

⁵ R. Burger, *Plato’s Phaedrus*, p. 65 seems to misunderstand the text since she writes: *The white horse*,

has always been autonomous in its control, of this we can be sure, for there is an explicit *always* in the text. What I am keen to insist on is that it has become such and hence is now autonomous in this given situation. If there is a self-restraint, this is by means of the good horse's autonomy in this respect, i.e. in *not leaping upon the beloved*. In other words, *not leaping upon the beloved* is a direct consequence of its being autonomous with respect to having the ability to control itself¹.

A consequence of all of the above is that there is an element in the soul other than the charioteer – and if we take him to be representative of the highest element of the soul, then there is an element in the soul other than the highest one – which is capable of some, indeed a considerable, degree of self-control. Consequently, the distribution of autonomy is not simple: not only the highest but also the middle element of the soul represented by the chariot is capable of self-control, although the importance or degree of both can differ and although the autonomy of the former may be prior in the temporal order to that of the latter².

This is the reason why this feature of the good horse should not be minimized. And even if the interpretation which I have been presented is debatable, it deserves the attention of those who analyze and comment on the *Phaedrus*' allegory. Furthermore, the feature in question brings about an essential modification of the middle element of the soul's character and raises the question of this element's true nature, and, as a consequence, the nature of the soul. With these observations in mind, both the nature and the dynamic of the inner conflict within the soul must be discussed in a new light. The middle element is not just an ally of the highest element. And if it is its ally, it is so as an autonomous force, a force that does not engross the highest element in its control, for it ensures its own self-control itself.

II Exemplification

1. A First Detail (253e5–254a1)

Now, having made some clarifications regarding the respective characters of the two horses and their contribution to the whole soul's situation, we are better prepared to go through the second, more detailed description of the

restrained through shame and wonder by [sic!] the command of the charioteer [...].

¹ I don't see how and why the good horse's restraining itself should be *l'action violente* [qu'il] *s'exerce sur lui-même* (ἐαντὸν κατέχει), as O. Renaut, *Platon. La médiation des émotions*, p. 208 wants it to be.

² Yet, it is still an open question how exactly the autonomy of the white horse should be spelled out. As it seems, Plato is himself hesitating since, on the one hand, we read about the white horse's self-control (see 254a2) and its doing no more no less than the charioteer does (see 254a7–b3), but, on the other, we are told that the white horse is violently pulled backward as the black horse is, though the former is pulled back willingly while the latter unwillingly. It is at this stage that Plato speaks about the white horse's shame and wonder (see 254c4) – but how its shame can be consistent with its self-restraint, this I cannot explain. Its shame results from being pulled backwards which, in turn, results from its going forward and together with the black horse. Does it mean that its self-restraint is transitory and not permanent? The ambivalence of its position perhaps lies in the fact that though the white horse is siding with the charioteer (254c2–3: τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν), it is nevertheless pulled back by him (254c1–2: τὰ ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τὼ ἵππων; on καθίσαι, transitive or intransitive, see below).

chariot. It is an allegorical representation of the soul of the lover described during a meeting with the beloved and it runs from 253e5:

*Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of tickling and prickings of yearning [...]*¹

up to 254e8–9, where, Plato returns to the general plan, i.e. to the soul of the lover with no more inward division of the soul, taken as a whole:

*[...] and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe*².

After that, Plato mentions the inner division of the lover's soul again only twice and only shortly, at 255e4–256a1³ and 256a5–6⁴.

Let me, then, tackle the two neglected details in the traditional accounts of the chariot allegory. I apologize to the reader for the large amount of quotations that follow, but they are rather necessary for bringing to the fore neglected problems and errors having to do with the allegory. Also they are necessary in order for the reader to follow my own point of view regarding these difficulties.

The first of the two details is to be identified in 253e5–254a1, where we read:

*ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχὴν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῆ, ὁ μὲν εὐπειθῆς τῶ ἡνιόχῳ τῶν ἵππων [...]. (when the charioteer sees the look of love, the whole soul being warmed by senses, [his being] filled with tickling and prickings of longing, one of the two horses, the one which is obedient [...])*⁵

A question is: what does *πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* (*the whole soul*) refer to?

It seems we have two options here and, indeed, all translations⁶ go for either of them, without, however, arguing for the option adopted. The translators of one group opt for *the soul of the charioteer* and another group for *the soul of the lover*. The first do so, because in their translations they add the possessive pronoun, which is absent from the Greek text. For example Jowett (1892⁽³⁾) translated in this way: *when the charioteer beholds the vision*

¹ Transl. H. N. Fowler, 253e5: ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα [...].

² Transl. H. N. Fowler, 254e8–255a1: ὥστε συμβαίνει τότε ἤδη τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν τοῖς παιδικοῖς αἰδουμένην τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν ἐπεσθαί.

³ ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλατος ἵππος ἔχει ὅτι λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον, καὶ ἀξιοὶ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι. ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν [...] (transl. H. N. Fowler: *Now as they lie together, the unruly horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in return for his many troubles; and the unruly horse of the beloved says nothing.*)

⁴ ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ αὖ μετὰ τοῦ ἡνιόχου πρὸς ταῦτα μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει. (transl. H. N. Fowler: [...]) *but the other horse and the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and reason.*)

⁵ Here and below, unless stated otherwise, underlining is mine.

⁶ Obviously not all existent, but all I have checked.

of love, and has *his whole* soul warmed through sense¹. Another group of translators render it ambiguously by *the entire* or *the whole* soul². Because they do not add the possessive pronoun one cannot be sure whose soul they have in mind. By not specifying the charioteer's soul it seems they understand it as *the lover's whole soul* rather than *the charioteer's whole soul*. This is implicit but it looks as if it were the case – I say *it looks* since two eminent translators from this group comment on this passage and from their comments we can see that they understand it this way. These are R. Hackforth and C. Rowe³. Hackforth (1952) translates: *when the driver beholds the person of the beloved, and causes a sensation of warmth to suffuse the whole soul*⁴, he begins to experience a tickling or pricking of desire; and the obedient steed [...] and in Rowe (1986) we read: *when the charioteer first catches sight of the light of his love, warming the whole soul through the medium of perception, and begins to be filled with tickling [...]*. What Hackforth means is quite clear from his commentary:

*The explanation seems to be that it is the rational part of the soul that the sight of the beloved immediately affects, the affection being then communicated by it to the other two parts.*⁵

¹ And so too Fowler (1925): *when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of tickling and prickings of yearning* | Chambry (1964): *Quand donc le cocher, apercevant l'objet d'amour, sent toute son âme prendre feu* | Frère (1981, paraphrasing): *Le cocher, qui par la sensation a répandu de la chaleur dans la totalité de son âme a son compte de chatouillement.* | Vicaire (1985): *Quand donc le cocher, contemplant le bel objet de son amour et sentant une chaleur se répandre dans toute son âme* | Nehamas & Woodruff (1995): *when the charioteer looks in the eye of love, his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire* | Mouze (2007): *lorsque le cocher a vu celui qu'il aime comme la prunelle de ses yeux, que son âme est tout échauffée par cette vision* | Brisson (2011 = 2012): *Lors donc que le cocher, voyant apparaître l'objet de son amour et sentant la chaleur qui s'est répandue dans toute son âme [...]*. As to Cazeaux (1997), his rendering *que le cocher voie l'amoureuse vision, et que de toutes parts cette perception répande la chaleur dans le souffle vital* is ambiguous (same for 254c4–5, see below: *chez le premier, la honte et l'effroi religieux ont inondé de sueur tout le souffle vital*), since it is unclear whose *souffle vital* is meant. J. Cazeaux, *Introduction*, p. 48, explains: *si j'ai traduit régulièrement ψυχή par souffle vital, c'est pour en sauver le dynamisme, et surtout pour que le lecteur n'oublie pas que l'âme dont parle ici Platon est d'abord une sorte d'étoffe universelle, taillée ensuite en habits spécifiques, des Dieux, des hommes, puis de tel individu.*

² To this group belong Ritter (1914): *Wenn nun der Lenker, nachdem er das Liebesantlitz erblickt und durch seine Anschauung die ganze Seele sich durchwärmt hat* | Pucci (1982): *Quando l'auriga alla vista del volto amoroso, tutto infiammato l'animo di quella sensazione, è invaso dalla mania e dal pungolo della passione* | Heitsch (1993): *Und wenn nun der Wagenlenker, den Blick voller Liebe und die Seele ganz von einem Gefühl wohliger Wärme erfüllt* | Reale (1998): *quando l'auriga [...] in tutta l'anima per questa sensazione, è rimpito dal solletico e dal pungolo del desiderio* (G. Reale in: *Platone, Fedro*, p. 231, provides notes only to 254b3–7 & 254e5, this is not to the detail in question) | Brinker (2008): *Wenn nun der Wagenlenker den geliebten Anblick sieht und die ganze Seele durch diese Wahrnehmung erwärmt.*

³ See also M. Burnyeat, *The passion of reason in Plato's Phaedrus*, p. 257: *[t]he emotional intensity of this realisation is such as to suffuse the whole soul (251b).*

⁴ This is the sense accepted by W. J. Verdenius, *Notes on Plato's Phaedrus*, p. 282. Nehamas & Woodruff who accept it too understand, nevertheless, the passage in question as *his entire soul is suffused with a sense of warmth* (see above). This shows that the way of understanding αἰσθήσει διαθερμύνας is not conclusive as to decide about πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν.

⁵ R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus*, p. 103, n. 3.

As for Rowe, he is less explicit. But it seems to me that his translation *the whole soul* refers to the soul of the lover since he adds the following note on 253e5–6:

*'warming the whole soul through the medium of perception': cf. 251 a 7 ff.*¹

Given that at 251b7 ff. Rowe is making a reference to Plato who at this point is speaking about the whole winged soul² and without any actual reference to its tripartition at this stage of the narrative, Rowe's *the whole soul* at 253e5–6 must refer to the entire soul of the lover as well.

And what about commentators? I start with Hermias of Alexandria who gives the following explanation:

– Τὸ δὲ πᾶσαν, τουτέστι δι' ὅλης ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς, καλῶς εἶπε [...] ³ ([saying] *whole, this is throughout entire soul, he says well*).

Let us see another commentator, W. H. Thompson:

ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος, κ.τ.λ.] *The mind, in the first instance, through the channel of the senses, apprehends the beauty of the ἐρώμενος, but the effect of this perception is not confined to the rational, but extends to the entire soul, both in its emotive and concupiscent region. This is evidently Plato's meaning; allegorically it is the driver who 'espies the amatory (love-inspiring) spectacle, and by sense diffuses a glow through the whole soul,' whereby he is himself 'filled with titillation and the strings of desire.' The two horses, we find, are, each in his own way, affected with the passion of Love. So too is the rational soul, which from the aspect of sensible conceives an uneasy yearning for ideal beauty. Without the aid of the senses, which are the ministers of the understanding, neither the affections nor the appetites could be warmed and excited. The νοῦς therefore, in its wider sense, may justly be said πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθεομήνας τὴν ψυχὴν [...]*⁴.

De Vries, almost identically, speaks about an extension of the charioteer's experience to other elements of the soul. He follows Thompson and Hackforth, literally taking up the former's comment:

The experience is ascribed to the ἡνίοχος: "the mind, in the first instance, though the channel of the senses, apprehends the beauty of the ἐρώμενος, but the effect of this perception is not confined to the

¹ C. J. Rowe, *Plato: Phaedrus*, p. 187.

² 251b7: πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή.

³ Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, pp. 196–197.

⁴ *The Phaedrus of Plato*, English notes and dissertations by W. H. Thompson, pp. 73–74.

rational, but extends to the entire soul, both in its emotive and concupiscent region" (Th.; similarly Hackf.). The distinction between the "parts" of the soul is *not a separation* [...] ¹.

An explicit comment is provided by Ferrari:

[...] *the charioteer feels the goad of desire at the first sight of the beloved, and indeed [...] is as it were the furnace that transfers the heat of this reaction to the other parts of the soul* [...] ².

Finally, in a recently published commentary on the *Phaedrus* by Harvey Yunis (whose translation runs as follows: [*the charioteer*], *having sent warmth through the whole soul by virtue of perceiving, is filled with tingling and goads of longing*), we meet:

Now it is specifically the charioteer who catches sight of the beloved, which excites desire in all three parts of the soul and, as the narrative is about to relate, causes them to react in different ways. ³

As it happens to be, all commentators I have been able to check support, or seem to support, the translation of the second group above. It looks as if – at least as far as I could find out – of those who opted for *πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* being the soul of the charioteer alone, nobody ventured an explanation, not even a single remark. Does it mean that they are ill grounded, not to say mistaken in their translation? I do not think so, but before I risk my own interpretation let me discuss the above comments.

As for Hermias, it is beyond any doubt that he understands the soul warmed through sensation as the soul of the lover. He glosses *πάσαν* by *ὅλης*. But then he goes on to say that:

τὸν γὰρ ἔρωτα ὅπερ ἐστὶ πάθος οὐκ ἔστι διὰ πάσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδεῖν, ἀλλὰ μέρους αὐτῆς κατὰ κακίαν ἐνεργούσης. – Τὸ δὲ διαθερμύνας, ἢ τουτέστι *πάσαν* ψυχὴν διὰ τῆς μνήμης ἀναγαγόν· θέρμην γὰρ καλεῖ τὴν ἀναγαγόν δύναμιν. ⁴ (*love which is an experience not because the whole soul sees but the soul's part when acting because of evil – warmed, that is, leading the soul through memory; by warmth he calls the leading force.*)

We have here, on the one hand, love which is activated in only one element of the soul, yet, on the other hand, he spells out that the whole soul is warmed, since the warming means the leading force of memory. Unfortunately, he gives no argument why he reads it this way.

¹ G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, p. 168 (the comment concerns 253e6–7).

² G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, p. 192.

³ H. Yunis, *Commentary*, p. 160.

⁴ Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, pp. 196–197.

As for Thompson, his comment is, in my view, ambiguous or implicit. On the one hand, he says that the effect *is not confined to the rational soul* and is extended to all three regions but, on the other, he says that *he* [i.e. the driver] *is himself 'filled with titillation* and that *each* [of the two horses] [is], *in its own way, affected with the passion of Love*. By claiming that [w]ithout the aid of the senses, which are the ministers of the understanding, neither the affections nor the appetites could be warmed and excited, Thompson seems to suggest that the soul's other regions are affected through the understanding's, i.e. the rational soul's (i.e. the charioteer's) senses. If he means by this that the mind apprehends the beauty alone – he says nothing about apprehending it by the two horses – he is wrong since, as the text makes it clear at 254b4, the two horses also apprehend the beauty¹. Finally, in his comment there is no word on the sensation of warmth (glossed, as it seems, by *glow* in his translation).

With Hackforth we come to an idea that the two horses follow the charioteer in being affected by his perceiving the beloved. This contradicts the text unless the horses are considered by Hackforth as blind in the sense that the charioteer perceives the beloved first and *immediately* and that the two horses start perceiving by themselves only after that – secondarily and only because the warming sensation has been transferred to them by the charioteer.

De Vries tells us that [t]he experience is ascribed to the charioteer, but he insists that there is no separation between the elements of the soul.

Rowe's argument is weak as far as he connects 253e5–6 with 251b7, especially because, in the meanwhile, Plato has changed the narrative perspective and moved from the whole person's soul to its division².

Ferrari who understands *πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* as the lover's soul, for he speaks about a transfer of the heat of this reaction to the other parts of the soul, does not explain the nature of this transference.

Yunis' idea seems to be that all three, the charioteer and both horses, are affected by the vision of the beloved operating through the charioteer alone. Although they react in different ways, he admits that *warmth sent by the charioteer* is common to all of them.

To sum up: The commentators quoted above agree on associating *πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* with the lover's soul and differ in their arguments (if indeed they provide any) and in their interpretations of how such an association works. Yet I am myself more inclined to support the first group of translators' reading (i.e. *πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* as referring to the (entire) charioteer's soul), and, consequently, to opt for a two-tier or two-level division of the soul, i.e. a division of the lover's soul into three elements and, then, of those elements into sub-elements. This is the crux of my contribution which, I hope, can be supported by the following three arguments.

¹ See 254b3–5: *καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν*. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face*.)

² Oddly enough Rowe doesn't refer to 254c4 where the syntagm is quite identical (see below). On the other hand, C. J. Rowe, *Plato: Phaedrus*, p. 184 is right when commenting on 251b7: *b 7 'for formerly the whole of it was winged': the whole of it, not just the rational part, once floated free*, since, according to the *Phaedrus*' account, the whole soul, the charioteer together with both horses included, is immortal.

i) A First Argument

My first argument grounds itself on the structure of the allegory's narrative. Apart from the fact that the assumption of the horses' reliance on the charioteer's seeing of the beloved is at odds with 254b4 (where it is said that the good and the bad horses have their own perception of the beloved), it can be observed that the passage in question is about *the elements* of the whole allegorized soul and not about the whole allegorized soul, i.e. the soul of the lover of which the charioteer and the two horses are elements, as it occurs at 246a3–4¹, at 253c7–8², and, finally, at 254e8–9³. If, however, it is the whole allegorized soul that is meant and which is said to be warmed, then we should acknowledge a shift from the charioteer to the whole soul in this particular line, and then a shift back, from the whole soul to the charioteer, in the next line. This, in turn, presupposes a sudden and double change⁴ in the narrative or an overlapping of two narrative perspectives. Since such an overlapping of two narrative perspectives, though not implausible given that *comparandum* and *comparans* are combined at 248a1–2 and 248a4–6 (see above⁵), seems to me hardly acceptable, I would rather opt for a two-level division. As it is, the description of the soul of the lover stops before the analyzed passage starts⁶. From 253c7 on, the main actor of the narrative is the lover's soul considered allegorically, as being divided into the charioteer and the two horses, and it is not before 254e8–9 that the general perspective of the lover's soul, considered as a whole, is taken up again. Only then does Plato return to the description of the whole chariot, the whole soul, which is the main theme of the allegory. From then on, the soul is being considered again in its entirety, because τὴν ψυχὴν refers plainly to the lover (τοῦ ἐραστοῦ): τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν. This is why, when at 253e5–6 we read πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν in relation to ὁ ἡνίοχος and opposed to ὁ μὲν εὐπειθὴς τῷ ἡνίοχῳ τῶν ἵππων, it seems logical to understand it as *when the charioteer sees the look of love, his [i.e. the charioteer's] entire soul is warmed, etc.*

¹ περὶ δὲ τῆς ιδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *but about its [i.e. the soul's] form we must speak in the following manner*)

² ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ διείλομεν ψυχὴν ἐκάστην. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts*)

³ τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν [...] αἰδουμένην τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν. (transl. H. N. Fowler: *the soul of the lover [...] in reverence and awe.*) What is inserted between 253c7–8 and 254e8–9 is about the elements resulting from the division of the allegorized soul of the lover.

⁴ Or even a double change made twice; see 254c4–5 and my comment below.

⁵ See above. Maybe I could say that *comparandum* and *comparans* are combined at another, introductory (?) stage of Socrates' argument about the soul, while in what I am analyzing here there is no more similar confusion of both.

⁶ For the soul of the lover see 251d6 (ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλω ἢ ψυχῇ οἰστροῖ καὶ ὀδυνᾶται, transl. H. N. Fowler: *so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain*) and for the soul of the beloved see 252e2 (οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐορώμενον, transl. H. N. Fowler: *The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus*) & 253a7–b1 (ἐπι τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοίωτατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ, transl. H. N. Fowler: *they pour it out upon the [soul of the] beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god*), both being considered in their entirety, i.e. with no reference to their division.

ii) A Second Argument

In my second argument I wish to refer to what can be called a contagion interpretation (the term contagion is mine), more particularly a downward¹ contagion, because this interpretation gives rise to many irreconcilable difficulties, which will become apparent as we progress. In the interpretation of the translators of the second group, and of the commentators above, the soul is being warmed according to the following scenario: first, by way of his perception the charioteer is warmed, and then this warming is transmitted to both horses. It would amount to a kind of downward contagion, i.e. a sensual contagion going from the charioteer down to both horses. In order to better answer the question if this is what Plato wants to say, an auxiliary question can be asked as follows: does an experience affect the whole perceiving subject or only a part of him? Consider the following: you perceive the beloved person². Is it only one element of your soul or is it your entire self that is immediately affected? If the former, is it the case that only then³ does this affection spread out to other, or rather to all other elements? And if so, does it follow that all regions, that is all three of Plato's regions, are similarly affected in one respect, such as warming, but not in others, such as ticklings and prickings of yearning? To put it another way: how can the charioteer by (his) perception affect sensations of the whole soul, i.e. of the good and bad horses which are distinct from him? And how can it be that all three are alike in sensing warmth but, at the same time, differ in all other sensitive respects, i.e. tickling and goads of longing? To put it otherwise, it needs to be asked why the charioteer transfers only one kind of sensation, i.e. warming, to the other elements of the soul, but not other kinds of sensation, i.e. tickling and prickings of yearning.

While it is easy to conceive that they all have different sensations through a similar (or the same?) perception, it is not so easy to picture that being sensitive they have only some sensations in common and not others, unless it be admitted that each of them has different sensitivities and that these are so finely constructed that the three elements have some sensations in common while others not. All of this would require that each element possess distinctive features according to which one could explain each of its reactions. In turn this would require that some of these features, or at least some of their reactions, such as warming, be transferable, while others, such as prickling, be not.

If someone, however, doesn't opt for either a full contagion or no contagion at all, he is then committed to argue for a limited contagion. But then one should spell out how such a limited influence does work and,

¹ I say downward because the charioteer is conceived (or is to be conceived) of as hierarchically higher than both horses due to his commanding function.

² It has been observed by R. Burger, *The Thumotic and the Erotic Soul*, p. 68 that [a] *stream of beauty flows into the lover's eyes and warms him*. This is wrong insofar as the charioteer's eyes are not identical with the lover's eyes.

³ One could wonder if this sequence, if put in a more modern vocabulary, is in accordance with neuroscience's discoveries.

accordingly, one should be in a position to explain its limits. If not elucidated, this seems to me to be but a gratuitous assumption because Plato's passage is organized in the following way:

ὁ ἡνίοχος [...] ὁ μὲν εὐπειθῆς τῷ ἡνίοχῳ τῶν
ἵππων [...] ὁ δὲ οὐτε κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν [...]

with nothing being said about their not being distinct from one another in one respect while being distinct from one another in another respect which would support the interpretation I am discussing. The structure of the text shows that the three elements are distinct not only structurally but also functionally in the act of experiencing an approach to the beloved person.

I would say that if they are all affected, they are affected differently to some extent at least (i.e. not identically), or if they are affected in the same way, I cannot see how being affected alike, they could behave in different ways. What occurs in Plato's passage is this: they react differently as to their behaviour in front of the beloved. Hence a question: if the good and the bad horses are dependent on the charioteer's sensing, why, then, are they not depending on his sensing entirely? As regards separate units this is conceivable: you can have sensations different from mine by way of my reporting to you what is seen or heard by me without seeing or hearing it yourself. But even then, I can influence or manipulate, to some extent at least, your sensations. And also, to be more precise, your sensations would have as object not the real object I am reporting to you but the report I provide to you. If this is so, why is it that the charioteer couldn't act in such a way as to make the bad horse obedient to him?

What I find peculiar in this interpretation is that both horses are subordinate to the charioteer's perception and some sensations and affections (e.g. warming), but not to other sensations and affections (tickling, prickings). Consequently, one should assume a substantial difference between a perceptive as well as an affective contagion with regard to warming on the one hand and an affective, as well as conative, contagion with regard to tickling, prickings and yearning on the other. To say more, both horses would be subordinate to the charioteer sensitively and affectively but not affectively and conatively. For, on this interpretation, the charioteer's perception and affection would contaminate or trigger an identical sensation in the charioteer and in the two horses but without *contaminating* the two horses' or, maybe, the bad horse's affection and desire.

iii) A Third Argument

At this point I must say I am not decisively convinced myself by the two above arguments given above, i.e. the first pertaining to the structure of the narrative and the second to the contagion. This is why I am adding a third one. It comes from a curious but manifest parallel within the same allegory. As a matter of fact, if we follow the reading of *παᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* as germane to the whole allegorized soul, we should be probably committed to do the same with *παᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν* at 254c4–5, where the syntagm is quite identical. The parallel question here, as well, is whether *the whole soul* refers or does not refer to the good horse alone:

[...] ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπὶ
 αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἰδρώτι πάσαν ἔβρεξε
 τὴν ψυχὴν, ὁ δὲ [...]. (*they move back both
 backwards, the one because of shame and
 astonishment wets the whole soul with sweat, while
 the other [...].*)

Just as there we had *πάσαν* [αἰσθήσει διαθεορμήνας] τὴν ψυχὴν, so here there is *πάσαν* [ἔβρεξε] τὴν ψυχὴν. And just as there the charioteer warms either the whole soul, i.e. himself and two horses, or only his own soul, so now, on the textual basis of a significant parallel syntax, it is to be claimed that the good horse wets either the whole soul, i.e. itself and the charioteer and the bad horse, or its own soul only. And here, as there, we have no precision of *ἑαυτοῦ* (= its own soul) either.

And, indeed, this is how all translators except one understand Plato's text, i.e. they render *πάσαν* [ἔβρεξε] τὴν ψυχὴν by *the whole soul*. Let us take but a few examples: Hackforth: *Now that they are a little way off, the good horse in shame and horror drenches the whole soul with sweat, while the other* | Rowe: *the first horse drenches the whole soul with sweat from shame and alarm, while the other* | Nehamas & Woodruff: *while one horse drenches the whole soul with sweat out of shame and awe, the other [...]*¹.

This rendering is striking insofar as all the translators of the first group above, with but one exception, are then inconsistent. Their inconsistency is to understand *πάσαν* τὴν ψυχὴν in 253e5–254a1 as pertaining to *the soul of the charioteer*, while in 254c4–5 they take *πάσαν* τὴν ψυχὴν to mean not *the soul of the white horse* but *the whole soul* (i.e. the whole soul of the lover). I cannot determine the reasons for their change of position which is to relate *πάσαν* on one occasion to one element of the soul only and on another to the sum of the three elements. In other words, Fowler, Chambry, Vicaire, Nehamas & Woodruff, Mouze and Brisson seem not to read 253e5–254a1 and 254c4–5 on the same grounds². By contrast, Ritter, Hackforth, Pucci, Rowe and Reale are consistent with their reading of the earlier passage, our passage in question. The only translator of the first group who is consistent all along is Jowett and there can be no doubt about it because he even adds in his translation of 254c4–5 a pronoun, *his*:

[...] *the one* [horse] *is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration [...].*

¹ See also Ritter: *Indem sie nun beide weiter sich entfernen, benetzt das eine vor Beschämung und Verwirrung die ganze Seele mit Schweiß, das andere* | Fowler: *And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other [...]* | Chambry: *l'un [...] mouille de sueur l'âme tout entière* | Pucci: *il primo corsiero, vergognoso e smarrito, inonda l'anima intiera di sudore* | Vicaire: *l'un [...] mouille de sueur l'âme entière; l'autre* | Heitsch: *Und haben beide sich etwas entfernt, dann läßt das eine aus Scham und Entsetzen die Seele ganz feucht werden von Schweiß, das andere aber [...]* | Reale: *l'uno per vergogna e per sbigottimento bagna di sudore tutta l'anima; l'altro, invece* | Mouze: *l'un [...] mouille toute l'âme de sueur* | Brisson: *l'un, de honte et d'effroi, mouille de sueur l'âme tout entière*. See also R. Burger, *Plato's Phaedrus*, p. 65: *The white horse [...] wets the whole soul with sweat [...]*.

² One could wonder whether this is a deliberate change of mind or an unconscious move. This is difficult to know, since none of them comments on this different rendering of the same syntagm in the two passages.

What about the commentaries? They are even fewer than those of the first passage. Hermias comments thus:

Ὁ μὲν ἰδρῶτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν·
ἰδρῶς γὰρ μέγας καὶ ἀγὼν οὗτος τῆ ψυχῆ, ὃν
ἀθλεῖ ἀναγομένη ἐπὶ τὸ νοητόν¹,

which means that here, too, he understands πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν as referring to the entire soul of the lover (which is being led to the upper, i.e. noetic region) and, that in this way, he is consistent with his reading of 253e5–254a1.

In W. H. Thompson we read:

*Presently, 254 C, the ἀγαθός ἵππος in his turn ἰδρῶτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν. The psychology of the passage is Platonic, if not in all points unexceptionable. Particularly striking is the description of passionate love, as distinguished from mere lust.*²

Yet this is not very conclusive. He associates πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν with the whole soul but, because he uses a Greek syntagm in his comment, it is hard to determine what Thompson exactly understands by it. It turns out then that, given the smaller number and the poorer clarity of commentaries, the good horse's wetting is, thus, *an even more neglected detail* than the charioteer's warming.

It is true that Plato does not use ἑαυτοῦ here either. For this reason, we can consider Plato as not being precise enough about whose warming/wetting is meant or even – because of πᾶσαν – as having in mind the whole soul's warming/wetting. It is also true that Plato constructs a subtle web of connections between the three elements, for instance, sometimes each of them acts on its own, but, on another occasion, they are coupled in action (and to this end Plato uses the dual number³) in opposition to the third element. Yet, in no place at this stage of the narrative, does Plato treat them all *en bloc*. At least from 254c1–2 on, both horses are opposed to the charioteer and are attached even more strongly to one another because of the dual number⁴, which, otherwise, is used more frequently in relation to the charioteer and the good horse than in relation to both horses⁵. But, then, the two horses are distinguished from one another at 254c4–5⁶ by a similar organization of the narrative as it is at 254a1–3:

¹ Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, p. 198.

² *The Phaedrus of Plato*, English notes and dissertations by W. H. Thompson, p. 74.

³ For more see my paper *Plato's Phdr. 253e5–255a1 revisited* [in progress].

⁴ E.g. 253c8: ἵππομόρφω μὲν δύο τινὲ εἶδη.

⁵ I make this suggestion because of Plato's use of dual number, e.g. 254a7–b3: τῷ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον ἀγανακτοῦντε, ὡς δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένω· τελευτῶντε δέ, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ πέρους κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον ἀγομένω, εἷξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε etc.

⁶ Although both horses are moving back (254c3: ἀπελθόντε, a dual number), i.e. behaving in the same way (see also 254c2: τῷ ἵππῳ), they do so for different reasons. Hence, moving back is the only common element of behaviour they share.

[...] ὁ μὲν [...] ὁ δὲ [...],

with Plato's focus on the good horse's wetting the whole soul and the bad horse's simultaneous ceasing its pain produced by the bit and the fall, yet reviling with anger against the good horse and the charioteer for breaking an agreement. I suppose, if it were wetted by the good horse's experience that kind of behaviour would no longer be present. This is why, given such a double distinction, it seems to me scarcely possible to extend the good horse's experience to the two other elements of the chariot. Therefore, even if almost all translators and commentators are of the same view, I would be of a different opinion and claim that the experience described in 254c4–5 is exclusively that of the good horse, not of the bad one – let alone of the charioteer.

If one chooses to accept the interpretation I am disputing, then one necessarily gets involved, first and foremost, in a second double change of the narrative¹. In other words, if one accepts the discussed interpretation of 253e5–254a1, one will also be compelled to do the same for 254c4–5. But more importantly, the issue of contagion is again at stake. This is to say, if one accepts a downward contagion that proceeds from the charioteer to the two horses, one will now be compelled, given the symmetry of the two passages' syntax, to also accept an upward contagion going from the good horse to the charioteer². The image that such acceptance entails would logically be the following: when the good horse sees the beloved, it wets itself and next it wets the two other elements. This means that the whole soul of the lover is wetted because of only one element's affection. But such a process is even more convoluted than the previous case of the charioteer's warming, for now one needs to explain an *upward* contagion, i.e. an influence of a lower element (i.e. the good horse) upon the higher one (i.e. the charioteer). Indeed, providing such an explanation would prove to be most difficult and troubling on two counts: if a hypothesis about a downward contagion can be conceived of at all, as related to some kind of subordination, an upward contagion would contradict the very idea of subordination and would turn the relationship between the good horse and the charioteer upside down³. This conclusion is inevitable unless someone were to argue that warming is as different kind of affection from wetting as a downward contagion is from an upward one. One needs to assume either that both warming and wetting are a special kind of affection (i.e. of the kind of sensations that breaks the distinctness of elements which otherwise would be sharp and solid), or if one is reluctant to accept the upward contagion of wetting, one would now have to hold that only warming is of such a character.

Furthermore, regardless of whether the moment the charioteer is warmed (253e5: ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα [...]) and the

¹ See my comment above.

² And also a downward one going from the good horse to the bad horse.

³ While this is less problematic as for the relation between the two horses, because a downward contagion can be supposed in this case. Yet, it is not clear how to definitively treat the relation between them both: hierarchically because of the good horse's position which is closer to the charioteer, or symmetrically because of both horses being on the same level as a single team (see 254a5: τῷ σύζυγί, transl. H. N. Fowler: *to his mate*).

moment the good horse is wetted (254b7–c4: ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνιόχου [...] ὁ μὲν [...]) are the same or very nearly the same, i.e. different but not importantly distanced moments, the picture would be this: during the process of seeing the beloved, the one element of the lover's soul, say the charioteer, is warmed, while another, say the good horse, is wetted, and, then, immediately after that, these two affections, because of their being spread out, are mixed up within the whole soul. Therefore the question is: is the whole soul warmed or wetted or both? If two elements are first differently affected because of their seeing the beloved – the charioteer by being warmed and the good horse by being wetted¹ – what would it mean if these two affections expanded the next moment to the whole of the soul?

If, however, someone were to argue that these moments are not the same or nearly the same, one would have to probably rely on the absence of an explicit mention of both horses' seeing the beloved synchronically with the charioteer's seeing the beloved. It is true that in 253e5 the verb is in the singular (ἰδών) and it is not until 254b4 that we are told that this time both horses together along with the charioteer this time – and here the verb is in plural (εἶδον) – see the beloved. Does that mean that there are two stages of the approach to the beloved, such that first he is being perceived by the charioteer only, then by all of them? I don't think so. At 254e8 we are told that after being trained, the bad horse is in fear each time it sees the beloved. But, again, against this it could be argued that this is what happens after having been trained, while in 254b4 the circumstances are different. There Plato speaks about the first encounter of the lover with the beloved. This argument, however, makes little sense insofar as the lover must have already met the beloved in the past, hence there is no such thing as the first encounter which would be essentially different from others.

But some can argue for two stages of perception by saying that the charioteer, first, perceives the beloved from a long distance, then, both horses together with the charioteer see the beloved when they are closer to him. One might say also that the charioteer is perhaps more perspicacious. Yet, it seems to me far-fetched to sustain that both horses do not perceive the beloved as soon as the charioteer does given they both have all sensations and behaviours which they show from 254a2 to 254b4, e.g. pulling its mate forward or back, or it would mean that these sensations and behaviours must be produced via the charioteer's transfer of data. But, for instance, could the bad horse force the charioteer and the good horse to move further towards the beloved without seeing him? It seems to me that the good horse's not leaping on the beloved and the bad horse's forcing the charioteer and the good horse to approach the

¹ It would be too good to have an analogical passage containing πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν with relation to the bad horse's sensations. Yet, this fact seems paradoxical as far as the element supposed to be the most sensual is the most poorly described in this respect, with no bodily process somewhat similar to the charioteer's warming and the good horse's wetting. Moreover, one could ask why there is nothing of that kind said about the bad horse given that the bad horse is at some point (254d4–5: βιαζόμενος, χρομεπιζων, ἔλκων ἡνάγκασεν αὐτὸν προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς, transl. H. N. Fowler: *struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one*) winning the struggle which means that the whole soul (the charioteer and the good horses included) has sensations similar to it.

beloved dispel ambiguity over both horses' seeing or not seeing the beloved. Although I could imagine myself attacking what or whom I don't see, it would be simply a blind attack, which is not the case regarding both horses. I can imagine, for example, that soldiers during the Normandy landings, when still in aircrafts, could have some feelings, say fears, a long time before they perceived the target they were about to attack. But this is exactly the opposite of the case in the allegory: whereas Allied soldiers were brought by transporters, here, the charioteer is being transported by both horses that could very probably, if not necessarily, perceive the beloved towards whom they are leading the chariot.

If, therefore, I am right that the moments of warming and wetting are the same or nearly the same moment, should we then mean that the warmed element is being wetted and the wetted one warmed simultaneously, or rather the former is no more warmed when it starts being wetted and the latter no more wetted when it starts being warmed? One could ask, if these two affections are subsequently spreading out to the whole soul, what that soul as a whole is undergoing. More characteristically, if we accept the second reading on which the three elements of the soul are united in respect of being warmed and wetted, it could be wondered in what respect they are distinct. The issue of determining the limits of a downward as well as of an upward contagion comes to the surface. And the question arises as to why the contagion involves (only) being warmed/wetted and not other affections. Maybe the limits of contagion could be elucidated once the character of coordination, be it organic or mechanic, of the three elements has been spelled out. But as to the kind of coordination of the chariot's elements we know only as much as is said by Plato in the allegory. However, using the allegory's content in order to explain this content amounts to begging the question.

However, if one still claimed that both a downward as well as an upward contagion were possible one could, I believe, appeal to a limited or part contagion¹. After all, the good horse's sensation is determined by its shame and amazement. But if shame and amazement are its private, so to speak, feelings, it should be explained how it can be that its wetting is spread over the whole soul, i.e. to the bad horse and to the charioteer and its shame and amazement are not². This is why if in the second passage there is a talk of the soul of one element only, the same occurs in the first passage too. With the interpretation of $\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\nu$ as the lover's soul in the two discussed passages we are faced with, on the one hand, a limited and downward contagion (with a

¹ It could be argued that while only some sensations are subject to downward contagion and only some sensations but no emotions to upward contagion, we would still find it difficult to explain how warming and wetting, both being physiological, are being conveyed, respectively, down- and upward. Such an assumption would compel us to draw an even more complicated web of connections.

² It could be argued that only downward contagion, from the charioteer to both horses and from the good horse to the bad horse occurs. But if so, then bye-bye to the whole soul because in the second passage the charioteer would be out of the good horse's wetting. It could also be argued that there is more contagion between two animals than between human and animal, but here, again, we would be compelled to forget about the whole soul in the second passage. But if we go for two cases of downward contagion, then in the second case *whole* ($\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\nu$) is limited to two horses, i.e. the whole soul minus the charioteer. This is hard to accept.

stress on limited) and, on the other hand, with a limited and upward contagion (with a stress on upward). We are also faced with the problem of how to reconcile both kinds of contagion together and of how to reconcile a phenomenon of contagion with a distinctness of elements. If one supported the interpretation in question and argued that the elements of the soul are partly like and partly unlike in their reactions, it would call for an explanation from the commentators which, strangely, till now, has not been provided, even in a sketchy form. Moreover, the second reading would imply that the order of perceptions, some sensations and feelings is different from that of other sensations and feelings, as well as of desires, in that that the former are transferable while the latter are not¹. In a word, if a downward contagion is possible, then – in virtue of the syntactical similarity of both passages – an upward one should also be possible. But the latter is hard to conceive of, since, if it were, the structure of the chariot would resemble a mess.

Thereby the interpretation I am arguing against would be supporting, unless I am mistaken in understanding it, the idea that there is a kind of a special structure of the soul in terms of which there are two kinds of sensations and affections: some are alike for all of them while others are unlike. They all share a sensual experience of warmth but they differ in their experience of tickling and prickings of yearning. This is probably what is claimed by Hackforth who says that both horses are acted upon only after (*then*) the charioteer has been affected *immediately* by the sight (see above). But this would mean that both horses follow the charioteer only with respect to *some* functions and not others and this would call for an explanation which is not provided by him. This looks as if an idea of a limited sensitive or affective sympathizing of all three elements were being inferred *ex silentio*. For example Sheffield assumes that there is a specific difference between three elements of the soul², yet she seems to support the second group's interpretation, since she writes:

his [charioteer's] experiences affect the whole soul
(253e5–6)³.

If so, she should tease out the nature and/or limits of the distinction, i.e. in what respect they are distinct and in what respect they are not. Anyone in accord with Sheffield's interpretation should spell out why and how the experience of contagion works only with regard to perception and some sensations

¹ The three elements are akin of course in some other respects, e.g. they belong to the same soul and communicate, albeit not without problems.

² E.g. F. Sheffield, *Erôs before and after tripartition*, p. 221: *they are distinct desires*, p. 222: *three distinct kinds of movement in the soul*, p. 224: [t]he image of a charioteer and horses could simply be a way of representing three distinct kinds of movement, or desire, in the soul.

³ F. Sheffield, *Erôs before and after tripartition*, pp. 227–228. On the one hand Sheffield seems to think that the bad horse relies on the charioteer in its perceiving the beloved, for she says, pp. 229–230, that: [...] *the charioteer, who first catches sight of the boy, is already "filled with pricks of longing" before the black horse feels the effects of the charioteer's perception and drags the soul towards the boy* (Sheffield's underlining). On the other hand and at the same time, she recognizes that already as early as in 254a5–7 the bad horse perceives the beloved, for she writes, p. 229, that [i]t is not even clear that the black horse perceives in the relevant way here: *what he sees is the boy as an object of pleasure and sexual gratification* (250e, 254a5–7, d5–6). Alas, she doesn't say what *the effects of the charioteer's perception* (p. 230) felt by the black horse are.

and feelings but not with regard to other sensations and feelings. One would also have to specify how this capital distinction in influence and modification between vision and warming on the one hand and tickling and prickings of yearning as well as desires on the other can be inferred from Plato's text.

To sum up: as it happens, (1) none of translators and commentators referred to have considered the quandary of the (supposed) narrative shift, (2) moreover, they do not explain how exactly the three elements of the chariot are alike in some respect and unlike in another, and (3) a fortiori, the nature of contagion is not elucidated nor even considered in any way. With this being said, I am more sympathetic to the interpretation stating that in both passages – 253e5–254a1 and 254c4–5 – $\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$ refers to, respectively, the charioteer's and the good horse's soul. From such reading, it follows that the charioteer as well as the good horse – and the same can be inferred by analogy regarding the bad horse – possesses a soul of his/its own. The corollary is that we meet here a two-tier or two-level division: the lover's soul's elements have their own souls. Thus, the soul's elements are inwardly complex. If this is so, the tripartite soul consists of elements that are themselves composed. Consequently, this first conclusion, one that has been neglected by previous commentators, and which is the subject of this Section, can be called *the soul in the soul* or even *the souls in the soul* or *the souls of the soul*. This is because we discern the psyche of the lover but also the psyche of two elements of this lover's soul. In a word, the image Plato presents of the soul is more intricate than it has been commonly recognized and my interpretation has tried to address this intricacy. If, however, anyone wishes to dispute the conclusion I have put forth, they will have to put forward their arguments, which, to date and according to my best knowledge, have not been made sufficiently plain by any of the commentators or translators that have dealt with these passages¹. On this note the treatment of the first detail, namely, the question of whose soul is undergoing a change, comes to an end. The analysis has required scrutiny of select passages and a close analysis of the commentators' renderings as well as the heretofore unexamined paradoxes and difficulties that arise from these renderings. The analysis though has not been over philological minutiae. What has been shown, in fact, is that when this detail is examined closely it reveals not one neglected detail but a double neglect. Once this oversight is overcome and corrected, then the question of how the entire soul and its elements are responding to the beloved comes to the fore. Recognition of the difficulties regarding the functioning of these elements

¹ The closest interpretation to the one I am supporting of all I have encountered is that of Anthony W. Price in an unpublished paper. He uses a category of infection (I would take it to be synonymous with what I have called contagion). For A. W. Price, *Parts of the Soul in Plato's Phaedrus* (unpublished, quoted with permission), p. 6, says: *This is a response that the good horse shares with the charioteer (cf. edeise, b7): the charioteer feels awe and fear at the memory of the Form of Temperance (b5–7); the good horse, being at one but not one with the charioteer, catches the infection without the insight*. Yet, Price's remark is more intuitive than explicit and does not explicate how this infection operates. He neither says how he associates *edeise* to the good horse nor does he make a remark about *edeise*'s actual subject.

then places the issue of the nature of the soul, as presented in the allegory, in a more complex way. And this, the nature of the soul, is not a minor issue¹.

2. A second detail (254c7–8)

I shall move on to the second neglected detail. At 254b5–c1 we read:

ιδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
 κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν
 μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῶ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν·
ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν
ὑπτία, καὶ ἅμα ἠναγκάσθη εἰς τοῦπίσω
ἐλκύσαι τὰς ἡνίας οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥστ' ἐπὶ τὰ
 ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τῶ ἵππῳ [...].

The question I pose is: what is the subject of the six underlined verbs²? It is easy to answer: the two feminine participles, ἰδοῦσα and σεφθεῖσα, indicate that the subject must also be feminine. Given that it can be neither φύσιν (254b6) nor σωφροσύνης (b8), both being objects in the previous sentence, the only plausible candidate is ἡ μνήμη (254b5), the subject in the previous sentence. Therefore the passage can be rendered as follows:

when the charioteer sees, [his] memory is brought to the essence of beauty, and again [his memory] looks with prudence at it staying on the holy step; [and when the memory] beholds [it = the essence of beauty], [it = memory] is seized by fear and being in awe, [it = memory] falls backwards and at the same time [it = memory] is forced to pull back the reins very strongly [...].

And here we have a most important detail: *it is the memory which being in fear and awe falls backwards and is forced to pull back the reins.*

This detail has in the main been neglected in part due to mistranslations that distort the reading of the text, but also because commentators have avoided noting the difficulties posed by an accurate translation. Generally, those who understand the passage correctly do not do justice to it, either by omitting it in their commentary or by downplaying its importance. Most translators provide a wrong translation, because as a subject of the six verbs they adopt *the charioteer*, which is of masculine form – a problem which some of them notice. Thus Jowett writes: *He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence [...]* | Rowe: *at the sight he becomes frightened, and*

¹ I acknowledge that the expression *soul in the soul* and similar can be misinterpreted. I announce to the reader that I am at present completing another paper dealing in detail with the different levels of the soul in Plato. See R. Zaborowski, *Plato's Phdr. 253e5–255a1 revisited* [in progress].

² I do not analyze καθίσαι, since I prefer to follow *LSJ* and interpret it as intransitive and therefore, its direct subject is not the memory but both horses. In this case the memory is only a cause of both horses being sitting down on their haunches. But if not, then the subject of καθίσαι must be, consequently, ἡ μνήμη. See G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, p. 169: *Probably intransitive, but the transitive usage would be possible.* For H. Yunis, *Commentary*, p. 161 καθίσαι is better taken as transitive, making the charioteer's action more aggressive and parallel to the similar action described below [...].

in sudden reverence falls on his back, and is forced at the same time to pull back | Nehamas & Woodruff: At the sight he is frightened, falls over backwards awestruck, and at the same time has to pull the reins back [...]. Anyone can check other translations which I have omitted¹, but I believe that the above examples suffice for showing the pervasiveness of the error.

I have also checked some papers on the *Phaedrus* where the detail in question is referred to. As it can be inferred from the context, the subject is understood wrongly by e.g. J. de Romilly: *Il se renverse*², G. R. F. Ferrari: [...] *rears backwards*, because in the note 39 we read: *he was afraid*³.

Now, two translations are correct. One is given by J. Cazeaux⁴:

Mais cette vue rapporte la mémoire du cocher à la beauté en son origine: elle la revoit, accompagnée de la sagesse morale de maîtrise de soi sur le socle de pureté sainte où elle a son assise; à cette vue, la mémoire se sent pénétrée de crainte révérencielle, et elle retombe à la renverse, tandis que devenue obligée de ramener en arrière et de tirer les rênes, elle y a mis une telle force qu'elle fait tous deux accroupir les chevaux ... etc.

The underlining comes from Jacques Brunschwig whom I owe this information (one could note also: *accompagnée ... devenue obligée ... elle y a mis une telle force qu'elle fait ...*). Brunschwig was kind enough to check other French translations for me which he had at hand. All are erroneous because they

remplacent le féminin (la mémoire) par le masculin (le cocher), sans explication. Robin, Pléiade, 1950: le souvenir du cocher s'est porté vers la physis...il l'a eue devant les yeux... il l'a eue devant les yeux du souvenir, d'un souvenir mêlé de crainte et de vénération... Robin, Budé, 1954: les souvenirs du cocher (virgule après hèniochou) se portent... Il l'a vue dans son souvenir, et un mélange de crainte et de

¹ See also Ritter: *Bei diesem Anblick erschrickt er und in frommer Scheu beugt er sich rückwärts und zugleich muß er mit solcher Heftigkeit die Stränge an sich reißen [...]* | Fowler: *he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins [...]* | Hackforth: *he sees her once again [...]* then in awe and reverence *he falls* upon his back, and therewith is compelled to pull the reins | Chambry: *Devant cette vision, saisi de crainte et de respect, il se renverse en arrière* | Pucci: *l'auriga preso dal timore e dalla venerazione cade riverso all'indietro* | Vicaire: *Cette vision le saisit de crainte et de respect, il se renverse en arrière*. | Frère (paraphrasing): *Il l'a vue dans son souvenir. Un mélange de crainte et de vénération l'a fait se renverser en arrière*. | Heitsch: *Und bei ihrem Anblick überfällt ihn ein Schauer, und voller Ehrfurcht fällt er [= Wagenlenker] zurück und wird zugleich gezwungen, die Zügel so heftig nach hinten zu ziehen, daß beide Pferde sich auf die Hüften setzen [...]* | Reale: *Quando l'auriga lo vede [...] E come la vede, colto da timore e da rispetto, cade all'indietro e, a un tempo, è costretto a tirare indietro le redini [...]* (Reale provides a note to 254b3–7, but without referring to the detail in question) | Brisson: *Cette vision l'a rempli de crainte et, de respect, il se renverse en arrière*.

² J. de Romilly, *Les conflits de l'âme dans le Phèdre de Platon*, p. 107.

³ G. R. F. Ferrari, *The Struggle in the Soul: Plato, Phaedrus 253c7–255a1*, p. 4.

⁴ Plato, *Phèdre*, transl. J. Cazeaux, p. 149.

vénération, etc. (Il = le cocher, l' = la phusis).
 Vicaire, Budé, 1985: la mémoire du cocher (sans
 virgule après hèniochou) ... il la revoit... cette vision
le saisit. Brisson, GF, 1989: la mémoire du cocher...il
 l'a revue... cette vision l'a rempli... il se renverse.¹

A second correct translation, or at least a partly correct one, is that of L. Mouze². She is on the mark when she translates *sa mémoire a été saisie de peur et d'une crainte religieuse, et elle est tombée*, but is erroneous for her rendering of *le cocher est transporté par le souvenir* and *le cocher a été contraint de tirer*:

A sa vue, le cocher est transporté par le souvenir vers la nature de la beauté et il la revoit, en compagnie de la tempérance, dressée sur un socle sacré. En la voyant, sa mémoire a été saisie de peur et d'une crainte religieuse, et elle est tombée à la renverse. En même temps, le cocher a été contraint de tirer les rênes en arrière si fort [...].

And what about the commentaries? The first one is of Hermias of Alexandria who explains it as follows:

– Τὸ δὲ ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, τουτέστι εἴλκυσεν
 ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάντων εἰς
 τοῦπίσω.³

Given ἑαυτὴν (feminine form) it is obvious that according to Hermias the subject is *memory* and the meaning is that the memory withdraws (literally: *draws itself*) from all senses (αἰσθητά)⁴. Yet, although Hermias is right in his explanation, he draws no consequences from that reading. Thompson comments only on the *deponent aor. formed contrary to analogy from σέβομαι*, but says nothing about its being feminine form⁵. In G. J. de Vries we read:

b 7 ἰδοῦσα. *The feminine gender is determined by τοῦ ἡνίοχου ἢ μνήμη, above; the real subject is, of course, ὁ ἡνίοχος.*⁶

I must confess I am confused by de Vries' *real* and *of course* insofar as these two words are meant to explain sufficiently the difficulty of the text. The fourth comment is the note by Cazeaux accompanying his translation:

C'est la mémoire qui est le sujet de toute la contre-manœuvre, et il n'y a aucune raison, sinon celle d'une bienséance égarée, pour que la traduction

¹ A personal communication *per nuntium electronicum*, Nov. 2004.

² Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. L. Mouze.

³ Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, p. 198.

⁴ It is of interest that memory withdraws (itself) from sensation.

⁵ *The Phaedrus of Plato*, English notes and dissertations by W. H. Thompson, p. 75. Yet, p. 74, he says: *Presently we find that the driver 'brings both horses on their haunches' – but has he our passage in mind?*

⁶ G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, p. 169.

*suspende la métonymie en remplaçant la mémoire par le cocher.*¹

This is explicit, unequivocal and welcome: we have, therefore, a metonymy. Now, one could wonder why memory rather than anything else is a metonymy for the charioteer. Cazeaux, unfortunately, does not develop his interpretation further on this point². The fifth comment, which included several French translations (see above), is the one that I elicited from J. Brunschwig in response to my query about this passage in November 2004:

At first glance there are only two serious candidates (in feminine): mnèmè and phusis. But phusis doesn't work: the phusis of the beauty is seen in the previous sentence (eiden autèn), it can not be seeing (idoua) in this sentence. The mnèmè is the boss here. But what does that mean? Perhaps the memory of the charioteer, memory about which it can be said that it does this or that because the charioteer, insofar as he has a memory, does this or that, reacts in a specific way to what he sees. This is the charioteer who has a flashing view (idontos tou hèniochou, comma), and this is his memory which falls, by way of association and reminding, on "the nature of the beauty" [...] I can see only one solution: this is the charioteer who is the agent, but this is his memory who is the subject, because what he does or feels, he does it or feels it insofar as he is provided with memory [...] if the translators "replace the memory with the charioteer", why is that Plato replaces the charioteer with memory? I try to develop my idea: the charioteer reacts as he does in relation with what he sees (idontos tou hèniochou, comma) because he has a memory, which falls, by association and reminding, on "the nature of the beauty". Almost banally platonic.³

¹ Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. J. Cazeaux, p. 149.

² Elsewhere, J. Cazeaux, *Commentaire*, p. 375, seems to deform the context, because he speaks about *l'effroi authentique, religieux, de l'amant qui perçoit sur la beauté le reflet de la Beauté* on the one hand and about *l'effroi servile obtenu par le fouet* on the other. Yet, he who is in question here is the charioteer and not the lover as is supported by Cazeaux.

³ A personal communication *per nuntium electronicum*, Nov. 2004: *A première vue, il n'y a que deux candidates sérieuses (au féminin): mnèmè et phusis. Mais phusis ne va pas: la phusis de la beauté est vue dans la phrase d'avant (eiden autèn), elle ne peut pas voir (idoua) dans celle-ci. La mnèmè reste maîtresse du terrain. Mais qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? Peut-être la mémoire du cocher, mémoire dont on peut dire qu'elle fait ceci ou cela parce que le cocher, en tant qu'il a une mémoire, fait ceci ou cela, réagit de façon particulière à ce qu'il voit. C'est le cocher qui a une vision fulgurante (idontos tou hèniochou, virgule), et c'est sa mémoire qui se porte, par association et remémoration, vers "la nature de la beauté" [...] J'entrevois une solution: c'est le cocher qui est l'agent, mais c'est sa mémoire qui est le sujet, parce que ce qu'il fait ou ressent, il le fait et le ressent en tant qu'il est doté de mémoire. [...] si les traducteurs "remplacent la mémoire par le cocher", pourquoi Platon remplace-t-il le cocher par la mémoire? J'essaie de développer mon idée: le cocher réagit comme il le fait à ce qu'il voit (idontos tou hèniochou, virgule) parce qu'il a une mémoire, qui se porte, par association et remémoration, vers "la nature de la beauté". Presque banalement platonicien.*

The sixth is a recent commentary published by Harvey Yunis who translates only a part of the passage: *the charioteer leans back*¹. His commentary runs as follows:

[...] *the charioteer experiences the awe and reverence inspired by this erōs [...] and recoils. [...] The feminine nominatives agree with ἡ μνήμη, but the charioteer is functionally the subject.*²

Again, just as I have asked de Vries about his *real* and *of course*, so I need to ask Yunis: are *but* and *functionally* sufficient to explain the difficulty, provided there is any, as I think there is, given that many of the translations of the passage are inaccurate³?

We have, therefore, a group of misleading translations, then another group of commentaries that carelessly minimize the difficulties, and finally a set of more relevant commentaries. I myself agree that [c] *'est la mémoire qui est le sujet de toute la contre-manœuvre* (vide Cazeaux) and that *the charioteer, insofar as he has a memory, does this or that, reacts in a specific way and that this is the charioteer who is the agent, but this is his memory who is the subject* (vide Brunschwig). On this issue I shall limit myself to saying only that Plato makes a fine distinction. Its meaning however, given the allegorical language of the passage, is difficult to determine. Yet, unless one wants to encumber Plato with a blunder, the detail seems to refer to the inward structure of the charioteer being one of the three elements of the chariot, i.e. of the allegorized soul of the lover⁴.

III Conclusion

In the paper my arguments are textual since they are based on Plato's *Phaedrus*' passages. I apologize for the large number of opinions quoted. It is necessary in order to prove that the details I am analyzing are actually neglected and to show to what extent they are neglected⁵. As a matter of fact,

¹ H. Yunis, *Commentary*, p. 162.

² H. Yunis, *Commentary*, p. 161.

³ I don't know what to think about Sheffield's statement (p. 229) that she is following Rowe's translation which she quotes as this: "[...] *As the charioteer sees it his memory is carried back*", since this is not how Rowe renders the passage (*at the sight he becomes frightened, and in sudden reverence falls on his back, and is forced at the same time to pull back*, see above). Maybe she has Rowe's other translation in mind but this is difficult to know because she gives as the reference 1998a (= Plato: *The Symposium*. Warminster: Aris & Philips). On the other hand, she comments, p. 230: *This longing, triggered and experienced by the charioteer, leads to "his memory [being] carried back."*

⁴ I think that *either* we agree that there is an allegory and what is included in this allegory must be read in the same allegorical way *or* there is no allegory and then no element of the description is to be understood allegorically. But I often meet readings which take some elements of the description allegorically, while others not. In my view it is unwarranted *unless* one wants to argue for a narrative shift (see above) within the description in which case he should explicate it.

⁵ Sometimes I have the impression that the *Phaedrus* passage I am discussing (in fact, the *Phaedrus* as such) is avoided by commentators who, by this step, arrive at conclusion in line with the prevailing interpretation. I give just two examples of authors with different backgrounds: S. Leighton, *The Value of Passions in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 5 (of the on-line version): [Plato's] *a very negative view of our passions* and, more recently, L. Monteils-Laeng, *Agir sans vouloir*, p. 81: [...] *le thumos, s'il n'est pas nécessairement sourd au langage du logos, ne saurait lui non plus véritablement penser.*

the passages in question are often read and frequently commented on, yet, as it seems to me, both details have so far not been considered accurately. Any polemic that arises as a result of these observations is completely secondary. My main concern is to look into Plato's text and follow its content as closely and rigorously as possible. Regarding the human chariot I first made a point on the character of the two horses. I suggest that their contribution to the whole soul's situation is secondary in comparison with the charioteer whose forgetfulness and evil are crucial in this respect. The charioteer is the one responsible for the poor training of the bad horse. Then I adverted to two passages, neglected or misunderstood by translators and commentators. The first detail gives rise to the idea that at least two elements of the (lover's) soul, the charioteer and the good horse, are inwardly differentiated because they possess their own souls. I believe this to be correct since both, the charioteer and the good horse, are referred to either by way of his/its wholeness or his/its soul only. As for the bad horse, it is not, unfortunately, treated in this way since there is no reference to its having its own soul. The second detail, which involves memory, seems to support this idea, because the charioteer's memory is the subject of some acts within/of the charioteer and it is he alone who seems to be the subject of the memory.

The first detail can be named *the soul in the soul* and is, in fact, a doubly neglected detail because of the same syntagm being used once as regards the charioteer and, on another occasion, as regards the white horse. However, I don't want to claim that we should understand *the soul in the soul* too literally. Rather, as Plato indicates it, this description is approximate. For this reason I take it to refer no more, no less than to the inward structure of the whole soul whose elements are also structured. They are not simple but complex in the sense that each element includes several functions, which, correspondingly, are nominally similar in different elements of the soul. After all, there is nothing surprising in the fact that, for example, they all individually see and they are all individually affected by sensing.

A striking thing is that the second detail – *a memory falling back* – confirms the interpretation of the structure of the soul as two-level: not only the charioteer, representing one of the soul's elements, is a subject of several functions, including memory, but also the included memory is subject of several functions, not homogeneous at all because they are as different as physical movements and mental acts are.

I must say, I am not able to determine how *memory can fall down*¹. Perhaps what Plato is poetically referring to with *memory's falling back* refers to its becoming sensuous. It is sensuous to the extent that the memory is not a pure cognitive packet stored in a logical refrigerator, hence the phenomenon of making its subject falling back or, I would add, an impression of feeling so. In a word, it is a way of describing how we are drawn back to behold the memory of such truth, to behold sensuously its beauty and its pleasure. I think it can be said broadly that a distinction of memory as a subject within the

¹ As J. Brunschwig, *Revisiting Plato's Cave*, p. 173 told nicely: [...] with Plato, you can never have the last word, nor the last brush stroke.

charioteer pertains to the fact that the charioteer is not simple, as it were atomic, but structured inwardly. Just as the chariot includes three elements, so too the charioteer includes several functions of which memory is the one about which we are told the more.

A closer analysis of the two details analyzed above results in the conclusion that it is more accurate to understand the structure of the soul as two-level and the soul's functions as distributed according to a more complex scheme than the one suggested by an only one level model. On the one hand, one and the same element is the subject of more than one function. On the other hand, more than one function, e.g. seeing or sensing in our passages, is ascribed to one and the same element. This fact is relevant for inciting us to render a fuller picture of the soul's structure as it is presented in the allegory. I cannot discuss this matter here and thus refer the interested reader to another paper in which such a detailed analysis is presented¹. Let me only say that the reading I opt for there flies in the face of the most common interpretation which views the three parts of soul, reason, spirit, and appetite as distinctive, in the sense that they are conceived as clear-cut, so that each has an exclusive assignment of functions. In my reading, Plato's allegory stands for an approximation of a more entangled theory of the soul. This allegorical presentation is elaborated in order to arrive for the purpose of putting forth a more comprehensive account of the complex structure of the soul's three parts which can explain the *soul's internal synergies* (K. Kalimtzis' expression²).

I want, however, to be clear enough about the structure of the soul as being *no-more-than-two-level* because of these functions being simple³. As we read, the lover's soul is structured into three elements and each of the soul's elements, i.e. the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse, contains several functions which are simple. Hence there is no infinite regress and a homunculus dilemma is out of question⁴.

One last word. If my interpretation cannot be accepted offhand in its overall form, this would not be strange or unexpected. Yet, in my view, such an attempt is preferable to remaining silent over a deformation or a

¹ See my paper *Plato's Phdr. 253e5–255a1 revisited* [in progress]. As for now let me mention a similar conclusion by A. W. Price, *Emotions in Plato and Aristotle*, p. 126: [...] *many emotions do not fit well within his tripartition* & p. 140: *Without separating off emotions as such, Plato and Aristotle alert us to their compositional intricacy, which involves body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling.*

² In a personal communication *per nuntium electronicum*, Jan. 2015.

³ If I am right saying that memory includes several functions, which, in addition, are heterogeneous, this makes my claim false. I don't know how to interpret it then, yet, as it seems to me, this is what Plato presents in the description of the charioteer's memory. Maybe it should be said that some functions, e.g. memory, are more complex than others, e.g. seeing, and in their case we should admit a third level of description.

⁴ See e.g. G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, pp. 201–202: *This method of psychological explanation has evoked unease among representatives of the more traditional approach; for surely, it is argued, to account for the complex behaviour of a person by appeal to sub-units which themselves behave like little persons endowed with multiple faculties – homunculi – is not properly to explain the behaviour of the person but merely reduplicate it, and so threaten a regress?* That the idea of two-level hierarchy is not vicious can be inferred from the fact that it was envisaged by a neurologist J. H. Jackson, *Croonian Lectures on Evolution and dissolution of the nervous system*, p. 661: *There are really subdegrees or subdepths of the second depth, and no doubt of the first and third depth [...].*

trivialization of Plato's text on such an important issue. As such, it is an attempt to follow more accurately Plato's text and to grasp the allegory's details in their conceptual distinctions, which, as it seems, are more complex than commonly recognized.

Bibliography

- Brinker W., *Platons Ethik und Psychologie. Philologische Untersuchungen über thymetisches Denken und Handeln in den platonischen Dialogen*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2008.
- Brunschwig J., *Un détail négligé dans la caverne de Platon* in: *La Recta Ratio. Mélanges Bernard Rousset*, (ed.) L. Bove, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris 1999, pp. 65–76.
- Brunschwig J., *Revisiting Plato's Cave* in: *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 19, 2003, (eds.) J. J. Cleary & G. M. Gurtler, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2004, pp. 145–177.
- Burger R., *Plato's Phaedrus: A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing*, University of Alabama Press, Alabama 1980.
- Burger R., *The Thumotic and the Erotic Soul: Seth Benardete on Platonic Psychology* in: *Interpretation* 32, 1/2004, pp. 57–75.
- Burnyeat M., *The passion of reason in Plato's Phaedrus* in: M. Burnyeat, *Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 238–258.
- Cazeaux J., *Commentaire* in: *Plato, Phèdre*, transl. J. Cazeaux, LGF, Paris 1997.
- Études platoniciennes*, vol. 4: *Les puissances de l'âme selon Platon*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2007.
- Ferrari G. R. F., *The Struggle in the Soul: Plato, Phaedrus 253c7–255a1* in: *Ancient Philosophy* 5, 1985, pp. 1–10.
- Ferrari G. R. F., *Listening to the Cicadas. A Study of Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.
- Frère J., *Les Grecs et le désir de l'être. Des Préplatoniciens à Aristote*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1981.
- Frutiger P., *Les Mythes de Platon. Etude philosophique et littéraire*, Félix Alcan, Paris 1930.
- Hackforth R., *Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1952.
- Hermiae Alexandrini, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, (ed.) P. Cuvreur, Librairie Emile Bouillon, Paris 1901.
- Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, (eds.) C. M. Lucarini, & C. Moreschini, De Gruyter, Berlin – Boston 2012.
- Hume D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (eds.) L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, [2nd ed.] Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978.
- Jackson J. H., *Croonian Lectures on Evolution and dissolution of the nervous system, Lecture II* in: *The British Medical Journal*, Apr. 5, 1884, pp. 660–663.
- Jowett B., *Introduction to Phaedrus* in: *The Dialogues of Plato*, transl. B. Jowett, vol. 1, [3rd ed.] Macmillan and Co., London 1892.

- Kamtekar R., *Speak with the same voice as reason. Personification in Plato's psychology* in: *Plato and the Divided Self*, (eds.) R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brittain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 77–101.
- Leighton L., *The Value of Passions in Plato and Aristotle* in: *Southwest Philosophy Review* 11 (Supplement, March 1995), pp. 42–56 (available online: <http://hdl.handle.net/1974/1914>, retrieved on Jul. 1, 2016).
- Liddell H. G., Scott R. & Jones H. S., *A Greek–English Lexicon with a Supplement*, Clarendon Press, Oxford [9th ed.] 1940 [= *LSJ*].
- Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer*, introd., texts, transl. M. J. B. Allen, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1981.
- Monteils–Laeng L., *Agir sans vouloir. Le problème de l'intellectualisme moral dans la philosophie ancienne*, Classiques Garnier, Paris 2014.
- Parmenides in: H. Diels & W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, vol. 1, Weidmann, Hildesheim 1989 [= DK].
- Plato, *Phaedrus*, transl. H. N. Fowler, Harvard University Press – William Heinemann Ltd, Cambridge, MA & London 1925.
- Plato, *Phaedrus*, transl. A. Nehamas & P. Woodruff, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis – Cambridge 1995.
- Plato, *Republic*, transl. P. Shorey, Harvard University Press – William Heinemann Ltd, Cambridge, MA & London 1969.
- Plato and the Divided Self*, (eds.) R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brittain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012.
- Platon, *Phaidros*, transl. C. Ritter, Verlag von F. Meiner, Leipzig 1922.
- Platon, *Phaidros*, Übersetzung und Kommentar von E. Heitsch, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1993.
- Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. E. Chambry, Garnier – Flammarion, Paris 1964.
- Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. P. Vicaire, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1985.
- Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. L. Mouze, Le Livre de Poche, Paris 2007.
- Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. L. Brisson in: Plato, *Œuvres complètes*, transl. L. Brisson & al., Ed. Flammarion, Paris 2011.
- Platon, *Phèdre*, transl. L. Brisson, GF, Paris 2012.
- Platone, *Fedro*, transl. P. Pucci in: Platone, *Opere complete*, vol. 3, Editori Laterza, Roma 1982.
- Platone, *Fedro*, (ed.) G. Reale, A. Mondadori, Milano 1998.
- Price A. W., *Reason's New Role in the Phaedrus* in: *Understanding the Phaedrus. II Symposium Platonicum*, (ed.) L. Rossetti, Akademie Verlag, Sankt Augustin 1992, pp. 243–245.
- Price A. W., *Emotions in Plato and Aristotle* in: *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 121–142.
- Price A. W., *Parts of the Soul in Plato's Phaedrus* (unpublished, quoted with permission).
- Renaut O., *Platon. La médiation des émotions. L'éducation du thymos dans les dialogues*, J. Vrin, Paris 2014.

- Rohde E., *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks* [1894], transl. W. B. Hillis, Routledge, New York – London [reprinted] 2000.
- Romilly de J., *Les conflits de l'âme dans le Phèdre de Platon* in: *Wiener Studien* 95, 1982, pp. 100–113.
- Rowe C. J., *Plato: Phaedrus*, Aris & Phillips, Warminster 1986.
- Sheffield F., *Erôs before and after tripartition* in: *Plato and the Divided Self*, (eds.) R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brittain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 211–237.
- The Dialogues of Plato*, transl. B. Jowett, vol. 1, [3rd ed.] Macmillan and Co., London 1892.
- The Phaedrus of Plato*, English notes and dissertations by W. H. Thompson, Whittaker & Co., London 1868.
- Verdenius W. J., *Notes on Plato's Phaedrus* in: *Mnemosyne* 8, 1955, pp. 265–289.
- Vries de G. J., *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, A. M. Hakkert – Publisher, Amsterdam 1969.
- Woolf R., *How to see an unencrusted soul* in: *Plato and the Divided Self*, (eds.) R. Barney, T. Brennan & C. Brittain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, pp. 150–173.
- Yunis H., *Commentary* in: *Plato, Phaedrus*, (ed.) H. Yunis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, pp. 85–249.
- Zaborowski R., *La crainte et le courage dans l'Iliade et l'Odyssée. Contribution lexicographique à la psychologie homérique des sentiments*, Stakroos, Warszawa 2002.
- Zaborowski R., *Sur un certain détail négligé dans la caverne de Platon* in: *Organon* 35, 2006, pp. 209–246.
- Zaborowski R., *Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques*, Stakroos, Warszawa 2008.
- Zaborowski R., *Plato's Phdr. 253e5–255a1 revisited* [in progress].